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Abstract
This article proposes an approach for real-time monitoring of risks in executable business
process models. The approach considers risks in all phases of the business process man-
agement lifecycle, from process design, where risks are defined on top of process models,
through to process diagnosis, where risks are detected during process execution. The ap-
proach has been realized via a distributed, sensor-based architecture. At design-time, sensors
are defined to specify risk conditions which when fulfilled, are a likely indicator of negative
process states (faults) to eventuate. Both historical and current process execution data can
be used to compose such conditions. At run-time, each sensor independently notifies a sensor
manager when a risk is detected. In turn, the sensor manager interacts with the monitor-
ing component of a business process management system to prompt the results to process
administrators who may take remedial actions. The proposed architecture has been im-
plemented on top of the YAWL system, and evaluated through performance measurements
and usability tests with students. The results show that risk conditions can be computed
efficiently and that the approach is perceived as useful by the participants in the tests.
1. Introduction
Business processes are constantly exposed
to a wide range of risks. As demonstrated
by the recent incidents in the finance sec-
tor (the e 4.9B fraud at Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale
[47]; the US$2.3B UBS rogue trading scan-
dal [33]), in the health sector (the Patel In-
quiry [96, 44]) and in the aviation industry
(terrorist attacks [101]), failures of process-
driven risk management can result in sub-
stantial financial and reputational conse-
quences, potentially threatening an organi-
zation’s existence.
According to the AS/NZS ISO 31000
standard, a business process risk is the
chance of something happening that will
have a negative impact on the process objec-
tives, and is measured in terms of likelihood
and consequence [89]. Legislative initiatives
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such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act1 and Basel
II [8] in the finance sector have highlighted
the pressing need to better manage busi-
ness process risks. As a consequence of
these mandates, organizations are now seek-
ing new ways to control process-related risk
and are attempting to incorporate it as a
distinct view in their operational manage-
ment [100, 75]. However, whilst conceptu-
ally appealing, to date there is little guid-
ance as to how this can be done concretely.
Currently, the disciplines of process man-
agement and risk management are largely
disjoint and operate independently of one
another [92]. In industry they are usually
handled by different organizational units,
where the disconnectedness of the risk con-
trol systems in place provide an environ-
ment for potentially massive risk exposure.
For example, in the UBS case, while
the bank employed best-practice financial
risk management strategies, the fraud en-
acted by a single trader exploiting a con-
firmation activity in the exchange-traded
funds process may potentially have contin-
ued for years without being detected [66].
UBS later admitted that the disengaged na-
ture of their risk and operational systems
meant that, while some unexplained ac-
tivity had been detected, it was not suffi-
ciently investigated, nor were existing risk
controls enforced [32, 33]. Rather, regular
risk reports, internal audits and external
reviews repeatedly delivered positive out-
comes, leading to management complacency
and a lack of healthy mistrust [90]. An-
other case in point is that of KfW Banken-
gruppe, which in 2008 transferred e 300M
to Lehmann Brothers using an automated
transfer facility hours before Lehmann de-
clared bankruptcy [79]. Such examples il-
1www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ204
lustrate a clear misalignment between risk
management and the (automated) enact-
ment of business operations. Disasters like
these are likely to become more prevalent
as businesses increasingly rely on heteroge-
neous, complex and distributed ICT sys-
tems for their day-to-day operations. Of
course, proper risk management is not only
pivotal in the finance sector, but also plays
a central role in many other domains, in-
cluding health (e.g., limiting the spread of
diseases and minimizing exposure to litiga-
tion), mining (e.g., physical safety), and avi-
ation (e.g., maintenance and terrorism).
Within academia, recent research has
centered on the characterization of process-
related risks. While risk metrics and mitiga-
tion procedures have been broadly explored
[89], such generalized strategies fail to tar-
get the specific requirements of process-
centric operationalization. Conversely, nu-
merous techniques have been developed for
specific domains [3, 57, 43, 13], but the na-
ture of such techniques renders them unable
to offer strategies that can readily be ap-
plied more generally.
Effective risk management is imperative
for organizational survival, and incidents
such as those described above reveal that
proper integration of risk management with
process management is now vital. Fur-
ther, a focus on risk analysis alone is no
longer adequate. Rather, active, real-time
risk detection, analysis and mitigation is re-
quired. Real-time risk detection is partic-
ularly essential in mission-critical business
processes or those involving life-saving ac-
tivities [20, 65]. Through the integration
of the risk management and process man-
agement domains, a number of key ben-
efits may be realized, from incorporating
risk analysis and mitigation strategies dur-
ing the process design phase, to monitoring
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and mitigating emerging risks during pro-
cess execution, to post-execution risk anal-
ysis using process log data.
We propose a concrete approach for real-
time monitoring of risks in executable busi-
ness process models. This is achieved by in-
corporating risk management into all phases
of the BPM lifecycle: from process design,
where high-level risks defined via a risk
analysis method are mapped down to spe-
cific process model elements such as activi-
ties, resources and data, through to process
diagnosis, where risks are detected during
process execution. By automating risk de-
tection, the interested users (e.g. a process
administrator or a risk manager) can be no-
tified as early as a risk is detected (i.e. in
real-time), such that remedial actions can
be taken to rectify the current process in-
stance, and prevent an undesired state of
the process (fault for short), from occurring.
Based on historical data, we can also com-
pute the probability of a risk at run-time,
and compare it to a threshold, so as to no-
tify the user only when the risk is no longer
tolerable.
The proposed approach is operationalized
via a distributed, sensor-based architecture
on top of Business Process Management
Systems (BPMSs). Each sensor is coupled
with a risk condition capturing the situation
upon which the risk of a given fault may oc-
cur. Sensors are defined at design-time on
the executable process model. Conditions
can be determined via a query language that
can fetch both historical and current ex-
ecution data from the logs of the BPMS.
At run-time sensors are registered with a
central sensor manager. At a given sam-
pling rate, or based on the occurrence of a
specific event, the sensor manager retrieves
and filters all data relevant for the various
sensors (as it is logged by the BPMS en-
gine), and distributes it to the relevant sen-
sors. If a sensor condition holds, i.e. if the
probability of the associated risk is above a
given threshold, the sensor alerts the sensor
manager which in turn notifies the moni-
toring component of the BPMS. The dis-
tributed nature of the architecture guar-
antees that there is no performance over-
head on the BPMS engine, and thus on the
execution of the various process instances.
We implemented this architecture on top
of the YAWL system [95]. We extended
the YAWL Editor to cater for the design
of risk sensors, and equipped the run-time
environment with a sensor manager service
that interacts with YAWL’s monitoring ser-
vice and execution engine. Finally, to facil-
itate the definition of process risks, we im-
plemented a set of risk templates for vari-
ous categories, such as organizational, data-
related and technology-related. Such tem-
plates are abstract risk definitions which
users need to bind to concrete process el-
ements.
To prove the feasibility of the proposed
approach, we used fault tree analysis [21]
(a well-established risk analysis method) to
identify risk conditions in a reference pro-
cess model for logistics, in collaboration
with an Australian risk consultant. These
risks embrace different process aspects such
as tasks’ order dependencies, involved re-
sources and business data, and relate to his-
torical data where needed, to compute risk
probabilities. We expressed these condi-
tions via sensors in the YAWL system, and
measured the time needed to compute these
conditions at run-time. The tests showed
that the sensor conditions can be computed
in a matter of milliseconds without impact-
ing on the performance of the running pro-
cess instances. Finally, we conducted a us-
ability analysis of the approach and its im-
3
plementation, by inviting 21 students to re-
port on their experiences while using the ap-
proach for analyzing and defining risk sen-
sor conditions. The results from this exper-
iment show that the approach is being per-
ceived as interesting and useful, especially
by novice users, confirming an intention of
the participants to use it.
This paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 illustrates the running example in
the logistics domain. Section 3 describes
our risk-aware BPM approach while Sec-
tion 4 presents the sensor-based architec-
ture to implement this approach. Section 5
formalizes the abstract syntax of the lan-
guage proposed for risk detection while Sec-
tion 6 shows how the risks defined on the
running example can be modeled via this
language. Next, Section 7 proposes a set
of risk templates to facilitate the definition
of process risks. Section 8 illustrates the
implementation of the sensor-based archi-
tecture, while Section 9 reports on the re-
sults of the performance and usability evalu-
ations. Section 10 covers related work while
Section 11 concludes the paper. Appendix
A provides the complete abstract syntax
of the language for sensor conditions; Ap-
pendix B provides a short description of the
actions defined in the language; Appendix
C describes the nested loops that can be
executed during the verification of a sensor
condition while Appendix D describes the
functions that can be invoked on variables
(that are resources) during the verification
of a sensor condition. Finally, Appendix E
provides the questionnaire used in the us-
ability tests.
2. Running Example
In this section we use an example to illus-
trate how the risk of possible faults to occur
during a business process execution can be
detected as early as possible. In particular,
we show how risks can be expressed in terms
of process-specific aspects such as tasks oc-
currence, data or available resources. Fig-
ure 1 describes the payment subprocess of
an order fulfillment business process which
is inspired by the VICS industry standard
for logistics [98]. The notation used to rep-
resent this example is that of YAWL [95],
although a deep knowledge of this language
is not required.
This process starts after the freight has
been picked up by a carrier and deals with
the shipment payment. The first task is
the production of a Shipment Invoice con-
taining the shipment costs related to a spe-
cific order for a specific customer. If ship-
ments have been paid in advance, all that
is required is for a Finance Officer to is-
sue a Shipment Remittance Advice speci-
fying the amount being debited to the cus-
tomer. Otherwise, the Finance Officer is-
sues a Shipment Payment Order that needs
to be approved by a Senior Finance Officer
(who is the superior of this Finance Offi-
cer). At this point, a number of updates
may be made to the Shipment Payment Or-
der by the Finance Officer that issued it,
but each of these needs to be approved by
the Senior Finance Officer. After the docu-
ment is finalized and the customer has paid,
an Account Manager can process the ship-
ment payment by specifying the balance. If
the customer underpaid, the Account Man-
ager needs to issue a Debit Adjustment, the
customer needs to pay the balance and the
payment needs to be reprocessed. A cus-
tomer may also overpay. In this case the
Account Manager needs to issue a Credit
Adjustment. In the latter case and in case
of a correct payment, the shipment payment
process is completed.
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Figure 1: Order-Fulfillment: Payment subprocess.
In collaboration with a risk analyst of an
Australian consulting company, we identi-
fied four faults that can occur during the ex-
ecution of this payment subprocess. In or-
der to prevent the occurrence of these faults,
for each of them we also defined an associ-
ated risk condition by using fault tree anal-
ysis [21]. Accordingly, each risk condition
is expressed as a set of lower-level boolean
events which are organized in a tree via log-
ical connectives such as ORs, ANDs and
XORs, an example of fault tree is shown
in Figure 2.
The first fault is an overtime process
fault. A Service Level Agreement (SLA)
for a process or for a given task within a
process, may establish that the process (or
task) may not last longer than a Maximum
Cycle Time MCT , otherwise the organiza-
tion running the process may incur a pecu-
niary penalty. In our case, an overtime fault
occurs if an instance of the payment subpro-
cess is not completed within an MCT of five
days.
To detect the risk of overtime fault at
run-time, we should check the likelihood
that the running instance does not exceed
the MCT based on the amount of time Tc
expired at the current stage of the execu-
tion. Let us consider Te as the remaining cy-
cle time, i.e. the amount of time estimated
to complete the current instance given Tc.
Then the probability of exceeding MCT
can be computed as 1 − MCT/(Te + Tc)
if Te + Tc > MCT and is equal to 0 if
Te+Tc ≤ MCT . If this probability is greater
than a tolerance value (e.g. 60%), we notify
the risk to the user. The estimation of the
remaining cycle time is based on past execu-
tions of the same process and can be com-
puted using the approach in [1], whereby
using an annotated transition system an es-
timation of the remaining cycle is calculated
by replaying the trace on the transition sys-
tem and returning the expected time anno-
tated on the last node visited (see Section 9
for more details).
The second fault is related to the re-
sources participating in the process. The
Senior Finance Officer who has approved a
Shipment Payment Order for a given cus-
tomer, must have not approved another or-
der by the same customer in the last d days,
otherwise there is an approval fraud. This
fault is thus generated by the violation of a
four-eye principle across different instances
of the Payment subprocess.
To detect the risk of this fault we first
have to check that there is an order, say or-
der o of customer c, to be approved. This
means checking that an instance of task Ap-
prove Shipment Payment Order is being ex-
ecuted. Moreover, we need to check that
either of the following conditions holds: i)
o has been allocated to a Senior Finance
Officer who has already approved another
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order for the same customer in the last d
days; or ii) at least one Senior Finance Of-
ficer is available who approved an order for
customer c in the last d days and all other
Senior Finance Officers who never approved
an order for c during the last d days are
busy. The corresponding fault tree is shown
in Figure 2.
The third fault relates to a situation
where a process instance executes a given
task too many times. This situation typ-
ically occurs in the context of loops. Not
only could this lead to a process slowdown
but also to a “livelock” if the task is in a
loop whose exit condition is purposefully
never met. In general, given a task t a max-
imum number of allowable executions of t
per process instance MAE i(t) can be fixed
as part of the SLA for t. With reference
to the Payment subprocess, this can occur
for example if task Update Shipment Pay-
ment Order is re-executed five times within
the same process instance. We call this an
order unfulfillment fault.
To detect the risk of this fault at run-
time, we need to check if: i) an order o
is been updated (i.e. task Update Ship-
ment Payment Order is currently being per-
formed for order o); and ii) it is likely that
this order will be updated again (i.e. task
Update Shipment Payment Order will be
repeated within the same process instance).
The probability that the number of times
a task will be repeated within the same in-
stance of the Payment subprocess is com-
puted by dividing the number of instances
where the MAE i for task Update Shipment
Payment Order has been reached, over the
number of instances that have executed this
task at least as many times as it has been
executed by the current instance, and have
completed. The tolerance value indicates a
threshold above which the risk should be
notified to the user. For example, if this
threshold is 60% for task t, a risk should
be raised if the probability of MAE i(t) is
greater than 0.6.
The fourth fault is an underpayment
fraud. It relates to a situation in which a
given task is executed too many times across
multiple process instances. Similar to the
previous fault, given a task t we can define
a maximum number of allowable executions
of t per process MAE p(t) as part of the SLA
for p. In our example, this type of fault oc-
curs when a customer underpays more than
three times within the last five days.
To detect the risk of underpayment fraud,
we need to check if: i) a debit adjustment is
currently being issued to a customer c (i.e.
task Issue Debit Adjustment is currently be-
ing performed for customer c); and ii) it is
likely that the maximum number of debit
adjustments will be issued to the same cus-
tomer in a d-day time frame. The proba-
bility that MAE p is reached for task Issue
Debit Adjustment of customer c in d days
is computed by dividing the number of cus-
tomers for which the MAE p for task Issue
Debit Adjustment has been reached within
d days, over the number of customers for
which this task has been executed at least
as many times as it has been executed for
c within d days. If this probability is above
a tolerance value, the risk should be raised
and the user notified. Similar to the pre-
vious risk, the tolerance value indicates a
threshold above which this risk should be
notified to the user. The corresponding
fault-tree is shown in Figure 2.
3. Risk-aware Business Process Man-
agement
As we have seen in the context of the
payment example, a process-related fault is
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Figure 2: The fault trees for Approval Fraud and Underpayment Fraud.
an unwanted situation that will negatively
impact upon the objectives of the busi-
ness process (e.g. the violation of a policy
may lead to a process instance being inter-
rupted), and is identified by a fault condi-
tion and a consequence. Identifying a fault
in a process requires determining the condi-
tion upon which the fault occurs. For exam-
ple, in the payment subprocess, we have an
underpayment fraud if a customer under-
pays more than three times within a five-
day time frame.
However, a fault condition holds only
when the associated fault has occurred,
which is typically too late to avoid a process
failure. Indeed, we need to be able to esti-
mate the risk of a process fault, i.e. if, and
possibly with what likelihood, the fault will
occur in the future. A process-related risk
is the chance of a process-related fault hap-
pening and is measured in terms of conse-
quence (inherited from it related fault) and
likelihood. Early risk detection allows pro-
cess users to promptly react with counter-
measures, if any, to prevent the related fault
from occurring at all.
We use the notion of risk condition, as
opposed to fault condition, to describe the
set of events that lead to the possibility of a
fault to occur in the future. In order to eval-
uate risk conditions “on-line”, i.e. while a
process instance is being executed, we need
to consider the current state of the BPMS.
This means knowing the state of all run-
ning instances of any process (and not only
the state of the instance for which we are
computing the risk condition), the resources
that are busy and those that are available,
and the values of the data variables being
created and consumed. Moreover, we need
to know the historical data, i.e. the execu-
tion data of all instances that have been
completed. In particular, we can use his-
torical data to estimate the probability of
a given fault to occur, i.e. the risk proba-
bility. For example, for the underpayment
fraud, we can estimate the likelihood that
another debit adjustment is being issued
for a given combination of customer/order
(historical data), given that one such debit
adjustment has just been issued (current
data). To obtain a boolean risk condition,
we compare the risk probability that we ob-
tain with a tolerance value, such that the
condition holds if the risk probability ex-
ceeds the given threshold. For example, we
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Figure 3: Risk-aware Business Process Management lifecycle.
raise the risk of underpayment fraud if the
risk probability is greater then 60%.
In other cases, we may avoid to embed a
risk probability in the risk condition, if we
are able to determine the occurrence of a
set of events which directly leads to a high
risk. This is the case of the approval fraud,
where both the events “Allocation to same
resource” and “Other resources are busy”
already signal a high risk of approval fraud.
Based on these considerations, we present
a novel approach for on-line risk detection
in business processes. The focal idea of this
approach, shown in Figure 3, is to embed
elements of risk into all four phases of the
traditional BPM lifecycle [31].
Input to this “risk-aware” BPM lifecycle
is a Risk Identification phase, where risk
analysis is carried out to identify risks in the
process model to be designed. Traditional
risk analysis methods such as FTA (as seen
in the previous section), Root Cause Anal-
ysis [50] or CORAS [58], can be employed
in this phase. The output of this phase is
a set of risks, each expressed as a risk con-
dition. It is important to notice that not
all risks identified during risk analysis can
be avoided by preemptively modifying the
business process in which they may even-
tuate. For example, an overtime risk, i.e.
the risk of not completing a process instance
within the required time limit, depends on
the particular way in which the given pro-
cess instance is being executed. Our ap-
proach specifically targets those risks that
can only be detected during process execu-
tion.
Next, in the Process Design phase, these
high-level risk conditions are mapped down
to process model-specific aspects. For ex-
ample, the condition “debit adjustment be-
ing issued to customer c for order o” is
mapped to the occurrence of a specific task,
namely “Issue Debit Adjustment” in the
Payment process model. The result of this
second phase is a risk-annotated process
model. In the next phase, Process Imple-
mentation, these conditions are linked to
workflow-specific aspects, such as content
of variables, and resource allocation states.
For example, “customer c” is linked to the
Customer element of the XML representa-
tion of the Debit Adjustment document.
Process Implementation may be integrated
with Process Design if the language used at
design-time is executable (e.g. BPMN 2.0 or
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YAWL).
The risk-annotated workflow model re-
sulting from Process Implementation is then
executed by a risk-aware process engine dur-
ing Process Enactment. Historical data
stored in process logs, and current execu-
tion data coming from process enactment,
are filtered, aggregated and analyzed in the
Process Diagnosis phase, in order to evalu-
ate the various risk conditions. When a risk
condition evaluates to true, the interested
users (e.g. a process administrator) are no-
tified and reports can also be produced dur-
ing this phase for auditing purposes. Fi-
nally, this phase can trigger changes to the
current process instance, in order to miti-
gate the likelihood of a fault to occur, or in
the underlying process model, to prevent a
given risk from occurring ever again.
In the next section we describe a sensor-
based architecture to operationalize our ap-
proach, according to the enhanced BPM
lifecycle described above. In particular, the
approach does not cover Risk Identification,
since the deliverables of this phase (e.g. a
fault tree) are already available in any or-
ganization that conducts risk analysis. As
for the last phase of the lifecycle (Process
Diagnosis), in this paper we only focus on
the risk monitoring part. Risk mitigation
is not in the scope of this paper as we pro-
posed a solution to this problem in separate
work [24]. More information on this solu-
tion is provided in the Related Work sec-
tion.
4. Sensor-based Realization
In order to realize our risk-aware BPM
lifecycle, we devised an approach based on
sensors. In a nutshell, the idea is to capture
risk and fault conditions via sensors, and
then monitor these sensors during process
execution. An overview of this approach is
shown in Figure 4 using the BPMN 2.0 no-
tation [68].
Sensors are defined during the Process
Design and Process Implementation phases
of our risk-aware BPM lifecycle (see Fig-
ure 3), for each process model for which the
presence of risks and/or faults need to be
monitored. If the process model is specified
via an executable language, then these two
phases coincide.
A sensor is defined through a boolean
sensor condition, constructed on a set of
process variables, and a sensor activation
trigger. Process variables are used to re-
trieve information from the specific instance
in which the sensor condition will be evalu-
ated as well as from other instances, either
completed or still running. For example, we
can use variables to retrieve the resource al-
located to a given task, the value of a task
variable, or the status of a task. Process in-
stances can either be identified based on the
current instance (e.g. the last five instances
that have been completed before the cur-
rent one), or based on the fulfillment of a
case condition (e.g. “all instances where a
given resource has executed a given task”).
The sensor condition can represent either a
risk condition associated with a fault, or a
fault condition, or both. If both conditions
are specified, the fault condition is evalu-
ated only if the risk condition evaluates to
true. For example, the sensor will check if
an overtime process fault has occurred in
a process instance only if first the risk of
such fault has first been detected, based on
the estimation of the remaining cycle time
for this instance. Finally, the sensor acti-
vation trigger can be either a timer peri-
odically fired according to a sampling rate
(e.g. every 5 minutes), or an event emitted
by the process engine (e.g. the completion
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Figure 4: Realization of risk-aware BPM lifecycle via sensors.
of a task).
During Process Enactment, the defined
sensors are registered with a sensor man-
ager, which activates them. In the Process
Diagnosis phase, which starts as soon as
the process is enacted, the activated sen-
sors receive updates on the variables of their
sensor conditions according to their trigger
(timer or event). When a sensor receives
an update, it checks its sensor condition.
If the condition holds, a notification is sent
from the sensor to the monitor service of the
BPMS.
The sensor manager relies on three inter-
faces to interact with the BPMS (see Fig-
ure 5(a)):
 Engine interface, used to register a sen-
sor with a particular event raised by
the BPMS engine. When the event oc-
curs the sensor is notified by the sensor
manager.
 Database interface, used to query the
BPMS database in order to collect cur-
rent and historical information.
 Monitor interface, used to notify the
detection of risks and faults to the mon-
itor service of the BPMS.
These interfaces can be implemented by
the vendor or user of the BPMS where the
sensor manager needs to be installed. In
this way, our sensor manager can virtually
be interfaced with any BPMS. As an exam-
ple, the conceptual model of the database
interface is showed in Figure 5(b), where
methods have been omitted for space rea-
sons. This conceptual model is inspired
by the reference process meta-model of the
WfMC [45], in order to cover as many as-
pects as possible of a workflow model, and
meantime, to remain as generic as possible.
For example, class WorkFlowDefinition al-
lows one to retrieve information about the
process model where the sensor is defined,
such as process identifier and name, while
class SubProcess allows one to retrieve in-
formation about a specific subprocess, and
so on. This interface should be implemented
according to the characteristics of the spe-
cific database used in the BPMS at hand.
For an efficient use of the interface, one
should also define indexes on the attributes
of the BPMS database that map the un-
derlined attributes in Figure 5(b). These
indexes have been determined based on the
types of queries that can be defined in our
sensor definition language.
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Figure 5: Sensor-based architecture (a); Database
Interface schema model (b).
An alternative approach to achieve the
portability of the sensor manager, would be
to read the BPMS logs from a standard se-
rialization format such as OpenXES [38].
However, as we will show in Section 9, this
solution is rather inefficient.
The advantages of using sensors are
twofold. First, their conditions can be mon-
itored while the process model is being exe-
cuted, i.e. in real-time. Second, according
to a distributed architecture, each sensor
takes care of checking its own condition af-
ter being activated by the sensor manager.
In this way, potential execution slowdowns
are avoided (e.g., the process engine and the
sensor manager could be deployed onto two
different machines).
5. Sensor Definition Language: Ab-
stract Syntax
In this section we describe the abstract
syntax [63] of the sensor definition language.
A detailed description of all elements of this
abstract syntax is reported in Appendix A.
The sensor definition language shares com-
mon aspects with programming languages
such as with query languages, since it is in-
spired to JAVA from a syntactic point of
view and to SQL for its semantics. During
the definition of the sensor definition lan-
guage we took in consideration the design
principles discussed in [39, 9], in particu-
lar: i) expressibility: is the language expres-
sive?; ii) completeness: can the language de-
scribe all objects of interest?; iii) extensibil-
ity: can the language be easily extended?;
iv) formal foundation: is the language for-
mally defined in order to guarantee unam-
biguity and executability?.
The design principle of expressibility led
to the introduction of various constructs
such as conditional and looping ones (dis-
cussed later in this section). The principle
of completeness led to the definition of el-
ements of the language that allow the re-
trieval of all information related to a work
item or a process instance available to the
workflow engine. In order to make the lan-
guage extensible, we structured it hierarchi-
cally allowing an easy introduction of new
constructs. Finally, the formal foundation
of the language drove the implementation
of the language and of its interpreter.
The definition of a sensor requires a risk
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condition, a boolean fault condition, a sen-
sor activation trigger, and a consequence
which represents the gravity of the impact
the fault will have on the company in case
it occurs. The trigger can be a timer based
on a sampling rate, or an event produced
by the engine interface. Risk condition and
fault condition are constructed on a set of
process variables. A variable is defined with
a mapping among a varName and an Info.
Sensor ,v : Variables; t : Trigger ;
riskCond : RiskCon;
faultCond : BoolCon;
consequence : MaCon;
Trigger , timer | event
Variables ,Assignment+
Assignment , result : varName; i : Info
This Info can be a constant (using
Definition), or the result of a function
executed on a variable (using VarFun),
or a piece of information collected from
the process instance (using CaseExp or
CaseEleExp). We use a CaseExp if the in-
formation is related to the process instance
itself, while a CaseEleExp if the information
is related to an element of a process instance
(that must be specified using TaskOrNet
that identifies a task by taskLabel or a net
by netName).
Info,Definition | VarFun |
CaseExp | CaseEleExp
VarFun ,ResCon | ResSimFun |
ResComFun
Definition , c : constant
CaseEleExp,ce : CaseExp; ton : TaskOrNet
TaskOrNet , taskLabel | netName
When we use a CaseExp we must
specify the instances of interest (using
CaseIDStat), and the action that identi-
fies the piece of information (using Action).
Such Action can either be an information
related to a predicate function, a predicate
function with input, a task or net variable
(i.e. a variable at the level of tasks or a vari-
able at the level of processes), or a task or
net subvariable (i.e. a subvariable of a task
variable or a net variable, respectively). An
instance can be identified in various ways,
by its position among all the instances of the
same process model (using absExp), by its
position respect the current instance (using
relExp), or by the fulfillment of some con-
ditions (using CaseConSet).
CaseExp,cis : CaseIDStat ; a : Action
CaseIDStat ,absExp | relExp | CaseConSet
Action ,predAct | inputPredAct |
taskOrNetVar | SubVarExp
SubVarExp,var+
These conditions can be on the identifier
of the process instance (using CaseParam),
or on a piece of information related to a
task or a net (using CaseCon). It is also
possible to specify multiple conditions that
are obtained by the conjunction of several
CaseParam and CaseCon elements (using
CaseConExp).
CaseConSet ,CaseCon | CaseParam |
CaseConExp
CaseConExp,ccs1 , ccs2 : CaseConSet ;
bo : BoolOp
CaseCon , ton : TaskOrNet ; a : Action;
co : CompOp; rhe : RHExp
CaseParam , i : idFun; co : CompOp;
rhe : RHExp
CompOp, le | leq | ge | geq | eq |
contains | isContained
Whether using a CaseParam or a CaseCon
it will be compared with a RHExp. A
RHExp can be a constant , a function, a
varName, or an expression containing those
elements (using RHExpSet).
RHExp,constant | function |
varName | RHExpSet
RHExpSet , rhe1 , rhe2 : RHExp; o : Op
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Once all the variables have been speci-
fied the risk condition can be defined. A
RiskCon is composed of two MaCon ele-
ments, one is the risk likelihood and the
other is the risk threshold. A risk condi-
tion evaluates true if the likelihood exceeds
the threshold. A MaCon is an arithmetical
expression that can use constants, variables,
results of functions invoked on variables (us-
ing ResSimFun, and ResComFun), and the
results obtained by the execution of loops
(using MaFor , and FixMaFor). A MaCon
may be in a conditional form, represented
as MaITE , or be a normal expression rep-
resented as MaExp, despite it is always pos-
sible to have conditional elements inside a
normal expression. A conditional expres-
sion MaITE is composed of a BoolCon rep-
resenting the if and two MaCons represent-
ing the then and else clauses, respectively.
RiskCon , riskL, riskT : MaCon
MaCon ,MaITE | MaFor | ResSimFun |
MaExp | FixMaFor | constant |
ResComFun | varName
MaITE , if : BoolCon; then, else : MaCon
From the definition of the MaExp ele-
ment on, the syntax describes an arithmeti-
cal expression. In fact a MaExp element
can be solved via the analysis of an unary
expression MaUnExp (i.e. a negative ex-
pression) or a binary expression MaBinExp,
that is an arithmetical operation between
two MaCons.
MaExp,MaUnExp | MaBinExp
MaUnExp, s : sub; me : MaCon
MaBinExp,me1 ,me2 : MaCon; mo : MaOp
MaOp,add | sub | mul | div | exp | mod
As said before a condition expression is
defined using a BoolCon. A BoolCon is a
boolean expression that can use constants,
variables, results of functions invoked on
variables (using ResCon), and the results
obtained by the execution of loops (using
BoolFor , and FixBoolFor). A BoolCon may
be in a conditional form, represented as
BoolITE , or be a normal expression rep-
resented as BoolExp, despite it is always
possible to have conditional elements in-
side a normal expression. A conditional
expression BoolITE is composed of three
BoolCons representing the if, the then, and
the else.
BoolCon ,BoolITE | BoolExp | BoolFor |
FixBoolFor | Comp | ResCon |
varName | constant
BoolITE , if , then, else : BoolCon
The BoolExp element represents a boolean
expression that is describes from this point
on. In fact a BoolExp element can be
solved via the analysis of an unary ex-
pression BoolUnExp or a binary expression
BoolBinExp, that can contain the result of
a comparison Comp, and so on.
BoolExp,BoolUnExp | BoolBinExp
BoolUnExp,n : neg ; e : BoolCon
BoolBinExp,e1, e2 : BoolCon; bo : BoolOp
BoolOp,and | or
Comp,ce1 , ce2 : CompElem;
co : CompOp
CompElem ,MaCon | ResListFun |
varName | constant
CompOp, l | leq | eq | geq | g | noteq
The functions that can be invoked on
a variable are identified by the elements:
ResCon, ResListFun, ResSimFun, and
ResComFun. These elements can be used
only in specific points of the syntax since
the result returned can be a boolean, or a
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list, or a number.
ResCon , res : varName; a : Activity
ResListFun , result : varName;
lrf : listResFun
ResSimFun , resource : varName;
srf : simResFun
ResComFun , res1 , res2 : varName;
crf : comResFun
Activity , resource : varName;
lrf : ResListFun
The constructs MaFor and BoolFor are
used to execute nested loops. The definition
of one of these elements requires to spec-
ify the type of loop (TypeBF for BoolFor
or TypeMF for MaFor), the list of vari-
ables (i.e. ListResult) that will be used to
create the nested loops (one loops for each
variable), and the expression that must be
executed. The constructs FixMaFor and
FixBoolFor are nested loops like MaFor and
BoolFor for which the variable fixEle deter-
mines the number of loops that need to be
executed. The TypeBF and TypeMF de-
scribe how the results of each execution will
be joined. It is possible to choose among
four types of loops: and (i.e. logic AND), or
(i.e. logic OR), add (i.e. addition), and mul
(i.e. multiplication).
MaFor , t : TypeMF ; lr : ListResult ;
fme : ForMaCon
FixMaFor ,fixEle : varName; mf : MaFor
TypeMF ,add | mul
BoolFor , t : TypeBF ; lr : ListResult ;
fbe : ForBoolCon
FixBoolFor ,fixEle : varName; bf : BoolFor
TypeBF ,and | or
ListResult ,varName+
As for a condition also for loops it is possi-
ble to assume conditional or normal forms.
The expression executed inside a loop is
similar to the condition expression but with
some variations. The ForMaCon is a arith-
metical expression that can use constants
and variables, the difference with an MaCon
is that it is not possible to use loops or func-
tions inside this type of expression.
ForMaCon ,ForMaITE | ForMaExp |
constant | varName
ForMaITE , if : ForBoolCon;
then, else : ForMaCon
ForMaExp,ForMaUnExp |
ForMaBinExp
ForMaUnExp, s : sub; me : ForMaCon
ForMaBinExp,me1 ,me2 : ForMaCon;
mo : MaOp
The ForBoolCon is a boolean expression
and does not allow the use of loops or func-
tions as the ForMaExp. Clarified this two
points, all the elements the name of which
starts with For are equals to the elements
used by an BoolCon.
ForBoolCon ,ForBoolITE | ForBoolExp |
ForComp | varName |
varName | constant
ForBoolITE , if , then, else : ForBoolExp
ForBoolExp,ForBoolUnExp |
ForBoolBinExp
ForBoolUnExp,n : neg ; e : ForBoolCon
ForBoolBinExp,e1, e2 : ForBoolCon;
bo : BoolOp
ForComp,ce1 , ce2 : ForCompElem;
co : CompOp
ForCompElem ,ForMaCon | varName |
constant
6. Risk Definition for the Running
Example
The abstract syntax defined in Section 5
has been used as a formal foundation for
the definition of the concrete syntax of our
language for sensor conditions. During the
realization of the concrete syntax we fol-
lowed the dot notation typical of object-
oriented languages, whereby a “.” is used
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as a separator between the object on which
a function is requested and the function
itself. In particular, whenever a function
“a()” needs to be invoked on an object “b”,
the structure used is “b.a()”. In the context
of our language we follow this hierarchy:
“case.task.action()”, “case.net.action()”, or
“case.action()” for the definition of vari-
ables, and “task.action()”, or “net.action()”
for the identification of cases which satisfy
certain conditions. Finally, another aspect
in common with object-oriented languages
is the declaration of variables. In our con-
crete syntax, conditions can only be defined
using variables that have been previously
declared and defined using a mapping.
Using this concrete syntax, we now have
all ingredients to show how the risks that we
identified for the Payment subprocess can
be captured via sensor conditions. There
is an overtime process if an instance of the
payment subprocess is not completed within
an MCT of five days (see Section 2). This
condition is checked by using two variables:
one to retrieve the amount of time Tc ex-
pired and the other to retrieve the Te re-
maining cycle time.
d = 5
Tc = case(current).Payment(PassTimeInMillis)
Te = case(current).(TimeEstimationInMillis)
Assuming a tolerance value of 60%, the
risk condition defined to monitor this risk
is:
(1-(d*24*60*60*1000)/(Te+Tc))>0.6.
There is an approval fraud whenever a
Senior Finance Officer (SFO) approves two
orders for the same customer within five
days (see Section 2). Accordingly, the cor-
responding risk can be detected if given an
order o of customer c to be approved, i) o is
allocated to a SFO who approved another
order for the same customer in the last five
days; or ii) the only SFOs available are the
ones who approved an order for customer c
in the last five days.
This risk condition is triggered by an
event, i.e. the spawning of a new instance
of task Approve Shipment Payment Order
(see Figure 1). This is checked using a vari-
able to retrieve the status of this task in
the current instance. The risk condition it-
self is given by the disjunction of the two
conditions described above. The first con-
dition is checked by using variable ASPO#
to retrieve the number of times this task was
completed for customer c by the resources
to whom is currently allocated. Variable
ASPO# is defined via a case condition over
customer c, the resource to whom is cur-
rently allocate (variable sfo1), the comple-
tion time of this task (that must be greater
than the start time of the current task Ap-
prove Shipment Payment Order minus five
days in milliseconds2), and the identifier of
the instance (that must be different from
the identifier of the current instance).
The second condition is checked by us-
ing two variables and invoking two func-
tions. Variable sfo2 retrieves which re-
sources completed task Approve Shipment
Payment Order, and variable sfo retrieves
all resources that can be offered this task
(i.e. the current task). The first variable
is defined via a case condition over cus-
tomer c and the completion time of this task
(that must be greater than the start time
of the current task Approve Shipment Pay-
ment Order minus five days). The two in-
voked functions return the number of tasks
2Time is measured in milliseconds as logging sys-
tems save timestamps in this unit, and this facili-
tates the comparison of timings.
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started on the resources that completed task
Approve Shipment Payment Order, and the
number of tasks in the execution queue of
the resources that have been offered this
task, and did not complete it for customer
c in the last five days.
After the definition of the variables, de-
fined in Table 1, the risk condition is speci-
fied as follows:
(ASPO#>0)∨((sfo2.startMinNumber=0)∧
(sfo.startMinNumberExcept.sfo2>=1)).
An order unfulfillment occurs whenever
an order is updated more than five times
(see Section 2). Accordingly, the respec-
tive risk can be detected if: i) task Up-
date Shipment Payment Order is currently
being performed for a given order; and ii)
it is likely that this order will be updated
again (i.e. task Update Shipment Payment
Order will be repeated within the same
process instance). The probability that
the number of times a task will be re-
peated within the same instance of the Pay-
ment subprocess is computed by dividing
the number of instances, where five execu-
tions for task Update Shipment Payment
Order has been reached, over the number
of instances that have executed this task
at least as many times as it has been ex-
ecuted by the current instance, and have
completed. This condition can be checked
by using variable USPO#US to retrieve
the amount of orders that have been up-
dated at least as much as this order, and
variable USPO#U5 to retrieve the amount
of orders that have been updated at least
five times.
The variables described can be defined
via the sensor definition language as in Ta-
ble 2. Assuming a tolerance value of 60%,
the risk condition is specified as follows:
(USPO#U5/USPO#US)>0.6.
An underpayment fraud occurs when-
ever a customer underpays more than three
times in a five-day time frame (see Sec-
tion 2). Accordingly, the respective risk can
be detected if: i) task Issue Debit Adjust-
ment is being performed for a given cus-
tomer and order (this is the trigger for this
risk); and ii) the probability that the max-
imum number of allowable executions for
this task will be reached in a five-day time
frame, is above the fixed tolerance value
for this risk, (this is the risk condition it-
self). This condition can be checked by
using variable Probability to retrieve the
probability that an attempted fraud will
take place. This variable use the Action
“FraudProbabilityFunc” to compute the
specific probability (see Appendix B), and
takes as input, among other information,
variable IDA#Issue which retrieves the num-
ber of times task Issue Debit Adjustment
has been completed for this customer.
The defined variables are implemented
through the sensor language as follows as in
Table 3. These variables are used to com-
pose the following risk condition, assuming
a tolerance value of 60%:
Probability>0.6.
The definition of actions and functions
used in the above variables is provided in
appendix. In particular, the complete list
of all actions is provided in Appendix B,
the complete lists of the nested loops and of
the functions are provided in Appendix C
and Appendix D.
7. Risk Templates
To facilitate the definition of concrete risk
conditions on process models, we defined a
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sfo1 = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(allocateResource)
c = case(current).Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company
d = 5
ASPO = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(OfferTimeInMillis)
ASPO# = case(Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(completeResource)=sfo1 ∧
Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company=c ∧
Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(CompleteTimeInMillis)>
(ASPO-(d*24*60*60*1000)) ∧ (ID)!=[IDCurr])
.Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(CountElements)
sfo2 = case(Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company=c ∧
Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(isCompleted)=“true” ∧
Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(CompleteTimeInMillis)>
(ASPOStartTime-(d*24*60*60*1000)) ∧ (ID)!=[IDCurr])
.Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(completeResource)
sfo = case(current).Approve Shipment Payment Order 593(offerDistribution)
Table 1: Variable definition for approval fraud risk.
USPO#UC = case(current).Update Shipment Payment Order 604(Count)
USPO#U5 = case(Update Shipment Payment Order 604(Count)>=5).
Update Shipment Payment Order 604(CountElements)
USPO#US = case(Update Shipment Payment Order 604(Count)>=USPO#UC ∧
Process Shipment Payment 603(isOffered)=“true”).
Update Shipment Payment Order 604(CountElements)
Table 2: Variable definition for order unfulfillment risk.
notion of risk template. A risk template is
an “abstract” risk condition defined using
generic tasks and generic variables associ-
ated with these tasks, which are not linked
to any real process model. These generic
tasks and variables will then be bound to
real tasks and variables when the template
is used to define a concrete risk condition for
a specific process model. These templates
are thus used as “shortcuts” to simplify the
definition of risk conditions.
Several studies address different types of
risks [76, 27, 62, 81, 86, 88]. After an anal-
ysis of these studies we decided to subdi-
vide our risk templates into categories re-
flecting these types of risks. We expect that
this division into categories also reduces the
effort required by a user to select a suit-
able template. These categories were de-
fined using the risk taxonomy proposed by
Rosemann and zur Muehlen [76] and other
types of risks proposed in the literature [40].
Our organization of templates based on the
above taxonomy is not intended to be an
exhaustive coverage of all possible process-
related risks. Instead, we provide an exten-
sible structure that can easily be extended
based on specific requirements or further
taxonomies.
We organized risk templates in two lev-
els. The first level is obtained using the
risk taxonomy, obtaining five categories of
risks. These categories are: i) Structural,
capturing risks deriving from wrong deci-
sions taken at design time; ii) Data, cap-
turing risks of damaging data integrity; iii)
Technology, capturing risks of impacting on
the availability of IT systems; iv) Organiza-
tional, capturing risks of process faults that
may impact on the employees or be caused
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IDAStartTime = case(current).Issue Debit Adjustment 605(StartTimeInMillis)
c = case(current).Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company
d = 5
IDA#Issue = case(Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company=c ∧
Issue Debit Adjustment 605(Count)>0 ∧ Issue Debit Adjustment 605
(CompleteTimeInMillis)>(IDAStartTime-d*24*60*60*1000))
.Issue Debit Adjustment 605(CountElements)
GroupingElement = Issue Shipment Invoice 594.ShipmentInvoice.Company
WindowElement = Issue Debit Adjustment 605(CompleteTimeInMillis)
Threshold = 0.6
Probability = case(Issue Debit Adjustment 605(Count)>0 ∧ (ID)!=[IDcurr]).
Issue Debit Adjustment 605(FraudProbabilityFunc, IDA#Issue, 3,
GroupingElement, WindowElement, (d*24*60*60*1000))
Table 3: Variable definition for underpayment fraud risk.
by them; and i) Goal, capturing risks of not
achieving the process objectives that cannot
be categorized in any of the previous cate-
gories. For each of these risk categories we
defined eleven subcategories. These subcat-
egories are based on the type of risks pro-
posed in the literature [40]. Specifically, we
have: i) Strategic, risks of affecting the im-
plementation of business strategies; ii) Op-
erations, risks of affecting the capability of
supplying and producing services or goods;
iii) Supply, risks that prevent a resource
from executing an operation; iv) Customer,
risks related to customers; v) Asset, risks
deriving from the use of an asset; vi) Com-
petitive, risks deriving from faults related
to competitiveness; vii) Reputation, risks of
loss of reputation; viii) Financial, risks of
financial loss; ix) Fiscal, risks caused by
changes in taxation; x) Regulatory, risks re-
lated to changes in regulations; xi) Legal,
risks of faults that may lead to legal actions.
Figure 6 shows a mind map illustrating how
risk templates are categorized and subcat-
egorized. This subdivision in categories is
not absolute. Thus, a situation in which a
risk could belong to more subcategories at
the same time is possible. In this case the
user should choose the template from the
subcategory considered to be the most ap-
propriate, i.e. the one that would generate
the risk condition that is the closest to the
user requirements.
We defined 14 risk templates as a start-
ing point for a larger risk template repos-
itory. For example, one template of type
Data/Operations, aims to detect a possible
inconsistency in the value of a critical vari-
able. The template requires a as the critical
variable, b the identifier variable, and two
set of instances s1 and s2, where s1 is com-
posed of the instances in which the values
of a and b are equal to the value of a and
b for the current instance, and s2 is com-
posed of the instances in which the value
of a is equals to the value of a for the cur-
rent instance. If the number of instances
in s1 divided by the number of instances in
s2 is greater than a certain threshold the
template triggers a notification. This risk
template can be used to represent a case in
which the critical variable is a credit card
number, or a bank account, while the iden-
tifier variable is the customer identifier.
Another risk template, of type
Goal/Financial, detects the possibility
that a particular process may exceed the
budget assigned for its execution. This risk
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Figure 6: Template structure with categories and
subcategories.
is detected looking at all the completed
instances of the process and at all the
completed instances with an execution cost
at least equal to the execution cost of the
current instance. The condition calculates
the probability that the current instance
will exceed the budget. This risk can be
associated with any process where the cost
is a relevant element. An example is an
insurance process where opinions from
different assessors may be required but the
total cost of their involvement should not
exceed the premium.
Considering the category Organizational,
subcategory Reputation, we have risks that
affect the reputation of the company due to
“employees’ mistakes”. For example, a de-
livery company may incur in a reputational
risk if a delivery needs to be rescheduled
due to an employee’ mistake. In this case
the customer may think that the company
is not professional enough with a consequent
impact on the credibility of the company.
In the category Organizational, subcate-
gory Supply, we defined a template that ad-
dresses possible delays with the execution of
tasks. It detects the possibility that a crit-
ical task would not be started as soon as it
is offered. This risk is detected looking at
all the resources which have been offered a
work item of the critical task. If the ratio
between the number of resources that are
busy versus the total number of resources
is greater than a certain threshold the risk
is detected. This type of risk is relevant
for processes in healthcare such as a pro-
cess for transferring organs from one hospi-
tal to another, where the unavailability of
a resource may cause the organ deteriora-
tion. Finally, taking in consideration the
process described in Section 2, let’s say that
the company wants to avoid that process-
ing a shipment payment may be subjected
to delays, what we have to do is: i) im-
port the template; ii) create a mapping of
our generic critical task to the task “Pro-
cess Shipment Payment”; and iii) modify
the specified threshold if required.
Table 4 provides a brief overview of the
templates currently available in the YAWL
system (see Section 8). Besides the three
templates described above, we have, among
others, templates for the following risks: un-
derpayment fraud, approval fraud, overtime
for activity, sequence of activities and pro-
cess, and violation of the four-eyes principle
within and across cases.
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Category SubCategory Template Name Risk Description
Data
Financial Underpayment Fraud Underpayment fraud
Operational
Data Inconsistency Across Cases
Wrong information provided, detected using
multiple cases
Data Inconsistency Parallel Activity Wrong information provided to parallel tasks
Goal
Financial Process Cost Exceeded
Exceeding the budget during the execution of
the process
Strategic
Activity Time Exceeded
Exceeding the time limit within which the
activity needs to be completed
Multi-Activity Time Exceeded
Exceeding the time limit within which a
sequence of activities needs to be completed
Process Time Exceeded
Exceeding the time limit within which the
process needs to be completed
Organizational
Financial Approval Fraud Approval fraud
Operational
Four-Eyes Principle Four-Eyes Principle violation
Four-Eyes Principle Across Cases
Four-Eyes Principle violation for activities
across different cases
Inadequate Preparation The activity is executed by a novice resource
Supply
Delay In Start The activity start will be delayed
Task Priority Unfulfilled
Activity with high priority cannot start
because resources are busy
Structural Operational Loop A loop is executed too many times
Table 4: Risk Templates and descriptions
8. Software Implementation
In order to prove the feasibility of our ap-
proach, we implemented the sensor-based
architecture in the YAWL system.3 We
decided to extend the YAWL system for
the following reasons. First, this sys-
tem is based on a service-oriented archi-
tecture, which facilitates the seamless ad-
dition of new services. Second, the system
is open-source, which facilitates its distri-
bution among academics and practitioners,
and widely used in practice (the system has
been downloaded over 100,000 times since
its first inception in the open-source com-
munity). Finally, the underlying YAWL
language is very expressive as it provides
wide support for the workflow patterns [95].
As part of this implementation, we ex-
tended the YAWL Editor version 2.2beta
with a new component, namely the Sen-
sor Editor, for the specification of sensors
within YAWL process models. Such graphi-
cal component, shown in Figure 7, fully sup-
3Available at www.yawlfoundation.org
ports the specification of sensor conditions
as defined in Section 4, and the specification
of risk templates.
A wizard (see figure 8) was developed as
part of the YAWL Editor to facilitate the
use of risk templates and in particular the
mapping required for their use. This wiz-
ard using an user friendly interface guides
the user during each step of the mapping,
providing a description of each generic task
and variable. The wizard also provides the
possibility of customizing a risk, since it is
possible to modify a risk condition during
the creation of a risk using templates.
Moreover, we implemented the Sensor
Manager as a generic component which ex-
poses three interfaces (engine, database and
monitor) as described in Section 4. We then
wrapped this component into a Web ser-
vice which implements the three interfaces
for the YAWL system, allowing the compo-
nent to interact with the YAWL Engine, the
Monitor service and the YAWL database.
While there is a straightforward mapping
between the YAWL Engine and our engine
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Figure 7: The Sensor Editor within the YAWL Editor.
Figure 8: Template Wizard: a) Tasks mapping, b) Variables mapping.
interface, and between the YAWL Moni-
tor service and our monitor interface, we
had to join several YAWL tables to im-
plement our database interface. This is
because in the YAWL system, event logs
are scattered across different database ta-
bles. For example, to retrieve all identi-
fiers of the process instances for a specific
process model, given the model identifier,
we need to perform a join among the fol-
lowing YAWL tables: logspecification,
lognetinstance, lognet and logevent.
The complete mapping is illustrated in
Table 5. As an example, this table also
shows the mapping between our database
interface and the relational schema used by
Oracle BPEL 10g to store BPEL process
logs. Also in this case, the database can
be fully mapped by joining several tables.
Finally, we implemented a separate ser-
vice to estimate the remaining cycle time Te
for a process or task instance. This service
uses ProM’s prediction miner [1] to com-
pute the estimations, and provides the re-
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sults to the Sensor Manager on demand.
While the estimation of Te could be done
on-line, i.e. while evaluating a particular
sensor condition at run-time, parsing the
full logset each time would be inefficient.
Rather, we compute this estimation off-line,
whenever a new process model is deployed
to the YAWL Engine, by using the logset
available at that time. Periodically, we up-
date the logset with the new instances being
executed meantime, and invoke this service
to refresh the estimations for each process
model currently deployed.
9. Evaluation
In this section we discuss two evaluations
of the sensor-based architecture. In Section
9.1, we discuss a performance analysis of the
implementation of the architecture in the
YAWL system, and in Section 9.2, we report
on a usability evaluation of the architecture
on basis of an online focus-group with 21
students that gained experience in using the
system for risk sensor condition analysis and
definition tasks.
9.1. Performance Analysis
We used our implementation to evaluate
the scalability of the approach. First, we
measured the time needed to evaluate the
basic functions (e.g. counting the number of
instances of a task or retrieving the resource
allocated to a task). Next, we measured the
time needed to evaluate the sensor condi-
tions for the risks defined in the Payment
subprocess. The tests were run on an Intel
Core I5 M560 2.67GHz processor with 4GB
RAM running Linux Ubuntu 11.4. The
YAWL logs were stored on the PostGres 9.0
DBMS. These logs contained 318 completed
process instances from 36 difference process
models, accounting for a total of 9,399 pro-
cess events (e.g. task instance started and
completed, variable’s value change). Specif-
ically, there were 100 instances from the
Payment subprocess yielding a total of 5,904
process events. The results were averaged
over 10 runs.
Table 6 shows the results of the evalua-
tion of the basic functions provided by our
language. In particular, in this table we
compare the evaluation times obtained by
accessing the YAWL logs via our database
interface, with those obtained by access-
ing a serialization of the logs, e.g. in the
OpenXES format. While OpenXES pro-
vides a simple and unique representation of
a generic set of process logs, accessing an
OpenXES file in real-time, i.e. during the
execution of a process instance, is not fea-
sible, due to the long access times (e.g. 6.5
sec. on average for evaluating a net vari-
able). On the other hand, accessing the
logs via our database interface, despite it
requires the creation of a specific imple-
mentation for each BPMS database, pro-
vides considerably faster times than access-
ing OpenXES files (at least 87% gain w.r.t.
OpenXES access). In fact, as we can see
from Table 6, the evaluation times for all
the basic functions are below 30 ms, apart
from function task variable, which takes
almost 100 ms and function net variable,
which takes about 430 ms.
The last two basic functions reported in
Table 6, namely task distribution and
task initiator, are evaluated in less than
250 milliseconds. These functions are not
computed by accessing the logs, but rather
by accessing information that is contained
directly in an executable process model, e.g.
the resources that are associated with a spe-
cific task. However, in our implementation
we still use the database interface to ac-
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Database table
Tables that need to be joined
YAWL Oracle BPEL 10g
WorkFlowDefinition logspecification, lognet, lognetinstance, logevent cube instance and cube scope
SubProcess logspecification, lognet, lognetinstance, logevent cube instance and cube scope
Activity
lognetinstance, logtask, logtaskinstance, lognet,
wftask and work item
logevent, logspecification, rs eventlog
Variables
logtask, lognet, lognetinstance, logtaskinstance,
audit trail, audit detail and xml document
logevent, logdataitem, logspecification
Role rs participant wftask
ActivityRole rs eventlog, logtaskinstance wftask
Table 5: Database interface mapping for YAWL 2.2beta and Oracle BPEL 10g.
Basic function Description
OpenXES Database Reduction
time [ms] time [ms] rate [%]
net status
functions checking if a net status has been reached
6,535 18.9 99.71
(isStarted, isCompleted)
net time
functions returning the time when a net status has been
6,781 18.8 99.72reached (startTime, completeTime, startTimeInMillis,
completeTimeInMillis)
net variable returns the value of a net variable 6,489 432.6 93.33
task count number of times a task has been completed 803 19.8 97.53
task resource
functions that return the resources associated with a task
850 20.9 97.54(offerResource, allocateResource, startResource,
completeResource)
task status
functions checking if a task status has been reached
792 30.5 96.14
(isOffered, isAllocated, isStarted, isCompleted)
task time
functions returning the time when a task status has been
824 22.3 97.29
reached (offerTime, allocateTime, startTime,
completeTime, offerTimeInMillis, allocateTimeInMillis,
startTimeInMillis, completeTimeInMillis)
task variable returns the value of a task variable 787 96.7 87.71
task
functions returning the resources associated with a task by
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distribution
default (offerDistribution, allocateDistribution,
startDistribution, completeDistribution)
task initiator
functions returning the allocation strategy for a resource
249.6 -association (offerInitiator, allocateInitiator, startInitiator,
completeInitiator)
Table 6: Performance of basic functions.
cess this information, in order to provide
the developer with a single access point to
all process-related data.
Table 7 reports the results of the eval-
uation of the sensor conditions defined for
our running example. While the sensor con-
ditions for the overtime process and order
unfulfillment faults are very low (below 150
ms), longer times are obtained for evaluat-
ing the conditions for the two faults related
to fraud. This is because both these condi-
tions require to evaluate “complex queries”,
i.e. queries over the entire process logs: in
the approval fraud, we need to retrieve all
resources that approved an order for a spe-
cific customer, while in the underpayment
fraud we need to retrieve all process in-
stances where a debit adjustment was is-
sued and aggregate these instances per cus-
tomer. These queries are different than
those needed to evaluate the basic func-
tions, as the latter are performed on the
events in the logs that are relative to a sin-
gle known process instance, e.g. the instance
for which the sensor condition is being eval-
uated.
The worst-case complexity of evaluating
one such a complex query is still linear
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Sensor
Min Max Ave St.Dev.
[ms] [ms] [ms]
Overtime process 121 137 131.8 4.66
Approval fraud 6,483 7,036 6,766.4 183.06
Order
69 91 77.4 7.18
unfulfillment
Underpayment
3,385 3,678 3,523 89.98
fraud
Table 7: Performance of sensors.
on the number of parameters that need be
evaluated in the query (corresponding to
the language element CondExprSet in Sec-
tion 4) multiplied by the total number of
instances present in the logs (corresponding
to the size of table WorkflowDefinition ad-
dressed by our database interface).
In conclusion, the performances of eval-
uating sensor conditions should always be
considered w.r.t. the specific process for
which the risks are defined, and the type
of trigger used. For example, let us assume
an average duration of 24 hours for the Pay-
ment subprocess, with a new task being ex-
ecuted every 30 minutes. This means we
have up to 30 minutes to detect an overtime
process risk before a new task is executed,
and we need to compute this sensor condi-
tion again. If we choose a rate of 5 minutes
to sample this condition, we are well below
the 6 minute-threshold, so we can check this
sensor condition up to 6 times during the
execution of a task. Since we do this in less
than 150 ms, this time is acceptable. For
an event-driven risk we also need to con-
sider the frequency of the specific event used
as trigger. For example, the approval fraud
risk is triggered every time an instance of
task Approve Shipment Payment Order is
offered to a Senior Financial Officer for ex-
ecution. Since we take up to 7 seconds to
compute this sensor condition, we are able
to cope with a system where there is a re-
quest for approval every 7 seconds. So also
for this sensor, the performance is quite ac-
ceptable.
9.2. Usability Analysis
For the evaluation of the usability of the
sensor-based architecture, we followed the
example from related studies [54, 55] and
conducted focus group-like online sessions
with students. Each online session con-
sisted of a tutorial followed by a question-
naire. Specifically, the tutorial provided de-
tailed instructions on the developed com-
ponent for defining sensors, and then pre-
sented two tasks that the students had to
perform with the system, related to the
analysis of risk conditions and of risk sensor
conditions. Once the students completed
the tutorial, they had to report on their us-
age experiences using a structured question-
naire (see Appendix E). The sessions were
not timed and no time limits were imposed
on the users.
The questionnaire consisted of five parts:
 In part one, participants had to pro-
vide relevant demographic information
about their process modeling experi-
ence.
 In part two, they were asked to provide
details about their experience in using
workflow management systems in gen-
eral.
 In part three, they were asked to pro-
vide details about their experience in
using YAWL in particular. The ques-
tions for parts one to three were, where
possible, adapted from prior surveys on
process modeling [54, 55] and usage of
the YAWL system [74].
 In part four, users had to report on
their experience in using the system to
perform the two tasks in the tutorial.
Specifically, these were:
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1. the analysis of the risk sensor con-
ditions for two YAWL models us-
ing the developed risk definition
language (risk scenarios 1 and 3
in Appendix E), and
2. the specification of risk sensor
conditions for a YAWL model
based on a risk definition using
fault tree analysis (risk scenario 2
in Appendix E).
The tasks in the tutorial were presented
using three risk scenarios on the basis
of the developed sensor-based architec-
ture. Risk scenarios 1 and 3 describe
risks using the developed risk definition
language. Here we asked participants
to analyze the risk proposed. Risk sce-
nario 2 describes a risk using a fault
tree. Here we asked participants to de-
fine such a risk using the proposed lan-
guage.
For each of these application tasks,
we assessed how well participants were
able to assess risks, in terms of accu-
racy of understanding the risks and the
difficulty of understanding the mean-
ing of the risks. Accuracy and diffi-
culty are widely used measures [14, 60]
of the effectiveness and the efficiency
of the sensor-based approach in terms
of how well users of the approach can
understand the risk information pro-
vided through the approach, and how
much cognitive effort is required to de-
velop this understanding. We used a 5-
point scale to measure the difficulty of
understanding the risk from very sim-
ple to very difficult, and we defined
five true/false/do not know questions
to measure accuracy of comprehension
of the risk information provided.
 In part five, we captured participants
perceptions about the usage experi-
ence of the approach as implemented in
the YAWL environment. This part of
the questionnaire contained measure-
ment items that were adapted from [74]
and measured satisfaction (SAT), use-
fulness (PU), ease of use (PEOU) and
intentions to use (ITU). Similar to pre-
vious uses of these items [71, 72, 74],
the measures were of appropriate relia-
bility, with Cronbachs Alphas ranging
from 0.64 (ITU) to 0.81 (PU).
For this evaluation, we recruited partic-
ipants by contacting individuals that had
previously completed a university under-
graduate or post-graduate course on busi-
ness process automation. The cohorts
were from the Universita´ della Calabria,
Cosenza, Italy and the Queensland Univer-
sity of Technology, Brisbane, Australia, and
we perused the course email lists for con-
tact. We recruited participants from these
cohorts because principles of process model-
ing and automation in general as well as the
YAWL system specifically were featured in
the courses, thus allowing us to select par-
ticipants with sufficient levels of background
experience and expertise, in turn minimiz-
ing the risk of confounding the usability re-
sults due to lack of experience with work-
flow systems or process modeling in general.
The usability test was administered be-
tween January and September 2012. Over-
all 21 participants participated, where 10
of them were from Italy and 11 from Aus-
tralia. Participants, on average, had about
2.6 years of experience with process mod-
eling and had read and created, on av-
erage, 71 and 15 process models, respec-
tively, over the last twelve months. Par-
ticipants experience with different process
25
Figure 9: Accuracy of risk comprehension, on a
scale from 0 (low) to 5 (high).
modeling languages varied, with most hav-
ing experience, at least, with UML Ac-
tivity Diagrams, Petri Nets, EPCs and/or
BPMN. These characteristics describe our
participants as proxies for novice to aver-
age BPM professionals, with one of our par-
ticipants representative of an expert practi-
tioners (more than 5 years experience, more
than 250 models created, more than 1000
models read). Overall, our study popula-
tion might not be representative of experts
but is roughly equivalent to the range of ex-
pertise found in actual BPM practitioners
as reported in other surveys, e.g. [73].
The box-plots in Figure 9 and Figure 10
show the accuracy of the comprehension of
the risks in the three scenarios as well as the
perceived difficulty of understanding these
risks. The data shows that scenarios 1 and
3 were reasonably well understood (averages
for the comprehension questions were 2.9 for
scenario 1 and 3.1 for scenario 3, both ex-
ceeding 50% accuracy), while comprehen-
sion of scenario 2 was significantly lower
(average score 1.7). Similarly, perceived dif-
ficulty was highest for scenario 2 (average of
3.7), while the perceived difficulty for sce-
Figure 10: Difficulty of risk comprehension, on a
scale from 1 (very simple) to 5 (very difficult).
nario 1 and 3 was similar in range (averages
3.4 and 3.3, respectively).
Next, we were interested in understand-
ing under which circumstances participants
were able to obtain higher levels of accuracy
in understanding the risk information pro-
vided. To that, we built a regression model
in which we regressed relevant demographic
data and perceived difficulty onto the to-
tal comprehension score across all three risk
scenarios. Specifically, we included as coef-
ficients:
 PMExp(Years): Process modeling ex-
perience in years
 PMExp(Training): Extent of formal
training in process modeling in days
over the last twelve months
 PMExp(SelfEducation): Extent of self-
education in process modeling in days
over the last twelve months
 PMExp(processModelsCreated):
Number of process models created over
the last twelve months
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Standardized
Coefficients
Variable Beta t Sig.
PMExp(Years) -0.80 -2.79 0.02
PMExp(Training) -0.03 -0.16 0.88
PMExp
1.28 4.31 0.00
(processModelsCreated)
BPMSFAM 0.38 1.15 0.28
YAWLUse(time) 0.80 3.07 0.01
YAWLUse(features) -0.30 -1.40 0.20
YAWLUse(models) -1.20 -3.86 0.00
RISKPerDif -0.19 -1.05 0.32
Table 8: Regression analysis of risk comprehension
across all three scenarios
 BPMSFAM: Self-perceived familiarity
with BPMSs [71]
 YAWLUse(time): length of use of the
YAWL system
 YAWLUse(features): Number of
YAWL features used
 YAWLUse(models): Number of YAWL
models created, read or edited over the
last twelve months
 RISKPerDif: Average perceived com-
prehension difficulty across the three
presented scenarios.
The regression model was significant (F
= 3.54, p = 0.04) and explained 77.9 per-
cent of the variance in total comprehension
score, thus attesting to very good explana-
tory power. Table 8 gives the results from
the regression model analysis.
Table 8 shows that four factors were sig-
nificant predictors for explaining compre-
hension accuracy, these being process mod-
eling experience in years, number of pro-
cess models created, use of the YAWL sys-
tem and number of YAWL models cre-
ated, edited or read over the last twelve
months. Several interesting findings are
noteworthy. First, PMExp(Years) and
YAWLUse(models) are negative predictors,
which may suggest that novice users with
little process modeling experience and lit-
tle experience with YAWL models bene-
fited more from the risk sensor approach.
Second, the difficulty of understanding the
risk information provided is not related to
how well users understand the risks. Third,
training in process modeling or more var-
ied use of the YAWL system, likewise, are
irrelevant in terms of understanding risk in-
formation provided by the sensor-based ar-
chitecture.
Finally, we were interested in the partici-
pants’ evaluation of the sensor-based archi-
tecture. Following the theory of technology
acceptance [28] and its extended application
in the process modeling context [72], we un-
derstand that satisfaction, ease of use and
perceived usefulness are key criteria for ex-
plaining intentions to use a process model-
ing artifact. Figure 11 shows the box-plots
for the average total factor scores for these
four criteria.
The data displayed in Figure 11 suggests
that participants rated the usefulness of the
approach high (mean score > 5.3) and were
in general inclined to use the system (mean
score > 4.4). Satisfaction with the approach
was reported as average (mean score = 4.0)
and ease of use, notably, was reported as low
(mean score < 3.5), indicating potential to
improve interface and user interaction of the
system. This is not surprising, since we did
not explicitly consider the principle of “clar-
ity” when designing the concrete syntax of
our language.
In a post-hoc analysis, we compared eval-
uations of SAT, PU, PEOU and ITU across
users that scored low or high on risk com-
prehension, based on a median split, and
across users that rated the perceived diffi-
culty of understanding risks as low or high,
again based on a median split. MANOVA
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Figure 11: Perceptual evaluations of the sensor-
based architecture on a scale from 1 (low) to 7
(high).
tests in both cases showed that evaluations
of the approach were independent from
comprehension accuracy or difficulty, with
p-values ranging from 0.30 to 0.49 and 0.18
to 0.58, respectively. The results indicate
that the evaluations of satisfaction, useful-
ness, ease of use and intentions to use were
robust against variances in the performance
in using the system.
In summary, our evaluation showed that
the sensor-based risk identification and
modeling approach provided value in allow-
ing participants to develop an understand-
ing of process risks. We found the ap-
proach to be useful particularly for users
with limited experience in process modeling
or BPMSs. The evaluation further revealed
that ease of use of the system should be im-
proved to warrant better user acceptance.
10. Related Work
Risk measurement and mitigation tech-
niques have been widely explored in vari-
ous fields. At the strategic-level, risk man-
agement standards prescribe generic pro-
cedures for identifying, analyzing, evaluat-
ing and treating risks (see e.g. [89]). Al-
though helpful, such general guidelines are
inevitably vague and fail to provide any spe-
cific guidance for operationalizing risk man-
agement strategies in business processes. At
the other extreme, there are many tech-
niques for identifying risks in specific areas
such as employee [3], conflict of interest [57]
and in the engineering field more gener-
ally [43, 13]. Other approaches, such as
fault-tree analysis [21], are general enough
to be applied to multiple domains. How-
ever, none of these approaches provides in-
sights on how to define and operationalize
the detection of process-related risks. In
the following, we first discuss related work
at methodological level with respect to the
proposed approach and then related work
with respect to the architectural level of our
proposal is discussed.
Previous process-based research recog-
nizes the importance of explicitly linking
elements of risk to business process mod-
els, through specific methodological ap-
proaches. Such approaches, discussed be-
low, can be mainly categorized into design
time Risk-aware BPM with and without in-
tegrated risks constructs. The former [76,
102, 48, 97, 82, 85, 83, 84, 26, 25, 100, 5] ana-
lyzes and models BPM risks through the in-
troduction of new integrated risk constructs
whereas the latter [64, 67, 78, 77, 11, 42, 91,
53, 94, 70, 56, 12, 46, 6, 7, 34, 35, 51, 4, 10,
80, 49, 87, 52] reuses existing risk analysis
methods. In the next paragraphs we are go-
ing to discuss the most relevant of these ap-
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proaches while we refer to [92] for a compre-
hensive discussion on all these approaches.
Among these approaches we can identify
several groups. The first group is com-
posed of the approaches described in [26,
25, 100, 64, 67, 78, 77, 82, 85, 83, 84, 56].
They propose to extend existing model-
ing languages, such as Business Process
Model and Notation (BPMN), Event-driven
Process Chain (EPC), Value-Focused Pro-
cess Engineering (VFPE), semantic busi-
ness process modeling language (SBPML)
and the integrated definition (IDEF) lan-
guage, with risk-related constructs. The ap-
proaches provide the possibility to annotate
business process models with risk-related
information and in some cases it is also pos-
sible to annotate mitigation actions. Fur-
thermore Rotaru et al. [67, 78, 77] also pro-
pose an utility calculation technique that
can be used to determine optimal risk coun-
termeasure solutions.
The second group is composed of ap-
proaches [4, 10, 80, 11, 6, 7] which propose
risk-informed design. In these approaches
common is the idea of modelling business
processes (in one or several stages) which
contain elements of risk and possible miti-
gation actions. These models are then used
to create a process model in which mitiga-
tion activities are already part of the pro-
cess itself. In particular, Betz et al. [11]
propose a method based on simulation to
choose the optimum process model variant
if several variants are proposed.
The third group focuses on simulation
and is composed of the approches described
in [48, 97, 94, 51, 49]. The ROPE (Risk-
Oriented Process Evaluation), methodology
proposed by Jakoubi et al. [48, 97], is based
on the observation that faults (here called
“threats”) impact the functionality of re-
sources (required for the execution of pro-
cess activities). If a threat is detected, a
countermeasure process or a recovery pro-
cess is invoked to counteract the threat.
The ROPE methodology aims to incorpo-
rate these aspects in a single model that
can be simulated to determine a companys
critical business processes and single points
of failure. Similarly, Taylor et al. [94], pro-
pose a simulation environment based on the
jBPM Process Definition Language (JPDL)
workflow language. In this environment
a process models annotated with risk in-
formation (i.e. key risk indicator (KRI),
key performance indicator (KPI), and risk
event) can be simulated in order to evalu-
ate the effects of risk events on some pre-
defined KPIs and KRIs. Finally, Kaegi et
al. [51] simulate a process model described
in BPMN via agent-based modelling tech-
nique to analyze business process-related
risks, while Jallow et al. [49], propose an
approach where risks in business processes
are analysed. The approach use the Monte
Carlo simulation [61], on a given a set of
identified risk events and their occurrence
probabilities, in order to assess and quan-
tify the impact/consequences of those risk
events (in terms of time, cost, performance,
and other objectives) on each process activ-
ity and on the overall process.
Other works which cannot be grouped
together annoverate: i) a taxonomy of
process-related risks [76, 102, 67], which in-
cludes five process-related risk types (goals,
structure, information technology, data and
organization) that can be captured by four
interrelated model types (risk structure
model, risk/goal matrix, risk state model,
and an extension to the EPC notation); ii)
an extended goal-risk framework [5], which
consists of an asset layer (composed of
business process goals, activities, and busi-
ness artifacts), an event layer (composed of
29
various events, including risk events, that
can impact the asset layer), and a treat-
ment layer (composed of a set of risk treat-
ment activities that can mitigate the im-
pact of the risk events modeled in the
event layer); and iii) a technique to evalu-
ate a workflow’s non-completion risk due to
uncertain/dynamic information [87], which
quantifies the confidence level of the non-
monotonic predicates of a workflow and
whether one of these confidence levels is be-
low certain threshold considers the workflow
to be risky suggesting the use of a backup
workflow.
Finally, in the approach proposed by
Kang et al. [52], a technique to estimate
the probability that a process instance en-
ters an abnormal termination state is de-
fined. Process-related historical data is used
to inform the probability estimation calcu-
lation. Then, a run-time risk estimation al-
gorithm is developed such that appropriate
risk alerts can be produced when risky situ-
ations are detected. The main limitation of
this approach is the necessity of having an
exhaustive log containing all possible exe-
cutions and the impossibility of making dis-
tinctions among different abnormal termi-
nation states.
With respect to the risk-aware BPM life-
cycle shown in Figure 3, all the above pro-
posals cover the risk-aware process model-
ing phase (see Table 9). None of them spec-
ifies how risk conditions can be concretely
linked to run-time aspects of process mod-
els such as resource allocation, data vari-
ables and control-flow conditions, for the
sake of detecting risks during process execu-
tion. Thus, none of these approaches opera-
tionalizes risk detection into workflow man-
agement systems. Moreover, they neglect
historical process data for risk estimation.
As such, these approaches are complemen-
tary to our work, i.e. they can be used at
a conceptual level for the identification of
process-related risks, which can then be im-
plemented via our sensor-based lower-level
methodology.
From the architectural point of view, our
approach, specifically our sensor-based ar-
chitecture, is also related to real-time mon-
itoring of business process execution. Simi-
larly to our approach, Oracle Business Ac-
tivity Monitoring (BAM) [69] relies on sen-
sors to monitor the execution of BPEL pro-
cesses. Three types of sensors can be de-
fined: activity sensors, to grab timings and
variable contents of a specific activity; vari-
able sensors, to grab the content of the vari-
ables defined for whole BPEL process (e.g.
the inputs to the process); and fault sensors,
to monitor BPEL faults. These sensors can
be triggered by a predefined set of events
(e.g. task activation, task completion). For
each sensor, one can specify the endpoints
where the sensor will publish its data at
run-time (e.g. a database or a JMSQueue).
We allow the specification of more sophis-
ticated sensor (and fault) conditions, where
different process-related aspects can be in-
corporated such as data, resource allocation
strategies, order dependencies, as well as
historical data and information from other
running process instances. Moreover, our
sensors can be triggered by process events
or sampled at a given rate. Nonetheless,
our sensor-based architecture is exposed as
a service and as such it could be integrated
with other process monitoring systems, such
as Oracle BAM.
A Sensor, as defined in this work, may be
categorized as a specialization of the more
general rules framework known as Event-
Condition-Action (ECA) rules, which orig-
inally came to prominence through their
use with Active Database Management Sys-
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Approach
Process Process Process Process
design/ implementation/ enactment/ diagnosis/
Risk-aware Risk-aware Risk-aware Risk
process workflow workflow monitoring
modeling implementation execution
zur Muehlen et al. [76, 102] X
Asnar and Giorgini [5] X
Karagiannis et al. [53] X
Singh et al. [87] X
Cope et al. [26, 25] X
Weiss and Winkelmann [100] X
Mock and Corvo [64] X
Rotaru et al. [67, 78, 77] X
Sienou et al. [82, 85, 83, 84] X
Lambert et al. [56] X
Jakoubi et al. [48, 97] X
Taylor et al. [94] X
Kaegi et al. [51] X
Jallow et al. [49] X
Bergholtz et al. [4, 10, 80] X
Betz et al. [11] X
Bhuiyan et al. [6, 7] X
Hermann and Hermann [42] X
Strecker et al. [91] X
Panayiotou et al. [70] X
Bhuiyan et al. [12, 46] X
Fenz et al. [34, 35] X
Kang et al. [52] X
Our proposal X X X X
Table 9: Comparison of available R-BPM approaches with respect to the four phases of our R-BPM lifecycle.
tems [30]. A Sensor extends the ECA no-
tion by including two conditions, one which
describes a potential fault, and the other
the possibility of risk. A Sensor also de-
livers a consequence when a triggered con-
dition evaluates to true, rather than an ac-
tion per se. ECA rules have also been used
as the basis for several well-known excep-
tion handling strategies in workflow sys-
tems [15, 17, 19]. For example, a defi-
nition language for exception rules called
Chimera-Exec was developed for the WIDE
prototype [16]. An extended ECA frame-
work can be found in the defeasable work-
flow approach [59], which has an added
justification condition to support context-
dependent reasoning of actions to be taken.
The RUMBA project combines ECA rules
with an Aspect-Oriented framework to pro-
vide a modular approach to the integra-
tion of rules and active processes [18]. The
Worklet approach incorporates an extended
rules-based framework, which embeds ex-
ceptions directly into the evaluation tree [2].
Real-time monitoring of process models
can also be achieved via Complex Event
Processing (CEP) systems. In this context,
CEP systems have been integrated into
commercial BPMSs, e.g. webMethods Busi-
ness Events4, ARIS Process Event Moni-
tor [29] and SAP Sybase [93], as well as
explored in academia [36, 41]. A CEP sys-
tem allows the analysis of aggregated events
from different sources (e.g. databases, email
accounts as well as process engines). Us-
ing predefined rules, generally defined with
a specific SQLlike language [99], a CEP sys-
tem can verify the presence of a specific
4http://www.softwareag.com/au/products/wm
/events/overview
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pattern among a stream of simple events
processed in a given time window. Our
approach differs from CEP systems in the
following aspects: i) strong business pro-
cess orientation vs general purpose system;
ii) ability to aggregate and analyze com-
plex XML-based events (e.g. process vari-
ables) vs simple events; iii) time-driven and
event-driven triggers vs event-driven trig-
ger only. Moreover, CEP systems typically
suffer from performance overheads [41, 99]
which limit their applicability to real-time
risk detection [99].
This article is an extended version of the
work presented in [23]. Compared to this
work, this article provides the full and re-
vised definition of the language’s abstract
syntax, the support for risk templates, the
usability evaluation with users and a com-
prehensive related work.
11. Conclusion
We contributed an approach for real-time
monitoring of risks in executable business
process models. The approach embeds ele-
ments of risk into each phase of the BPM
lifecycle: from process design, where high-
level risks defined via a risk analysis method
are mapped down to specific process model
elements such as activities, resources and
data, through to process diagnosis, where
risks are detected during process execution,
and those no longer tolerable are notified to
process administrators. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to con-
cretely embed risks into executable business
processes and enable their automatic detec-
tion at run-time.
As a second contribution, we provided
an operationalization of the proposed risk-
awareness approach on top of BPMSs.
This is achieved via a distributed, sensor-
based architecture that communicates with
a BPMS via a set of tool-independent in-
terfaces. Each risk is associated with a sen-
sor condition and refers to a fault, which is
an undesired state of the process. Condi-
tions can relate to any process aspect, such
as control-flow dependencies, resource allo-
cations, the content of data elements, both
from the current process instance and from
instances of any process that have already
been completed. At design-time, these con-
ditions are expressed within a process model
via a simple query language, for which we
provide an abstract syntax. At run-time,
each sensor independently alerts a sensor
manager when the associated risk condi-
tion evaluates to true during the execution
of a specific process instance. When this
occurs, the sensor manager notifies a pro-
cess administrator about the given risk by
interfacing with the monitoring service of
the BPMS. This allows early risk detection
which in turn enables proper remedial ac-
tions to be taken in order to avoid poten-
tially costly process faults.
We designed a set of risk templates to al-
low process designers to easily specify new
risk conditions into a process model. Each
template captures an abstract risk. To use
these templates, one has to bind the tem-
plate variables to concrete elements of the
process model for which the risk condition
needs to be monitored. We contend that by
using such templates the effort of defining
risks in executable process models can be
reduced.
As a proof-of-concept, we implemented
the sensor-based architecture on top of the
YAWL system along with 14 representa-
tive templates. We then used the tool
to evaluate the feasibility of the approach
in practice. This was carried out in two
directions. First, we evaluated the per-
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formance of the implementation; second,
we evaluated the usability and ease of use
of the approach with users of the YAWL
system. The performance measurements
showed that the sensor conditions can be
computed efficiently and that no perfor-
mance overhead is induced to the BPMS en-
gine. The results of the empirical evaluation
with users showed that the sensor-based risk
identification and modeling approach pro-
vided value to develop an understanding of
process risks. We found the approach to
be useful particularly for users with limited
experience in process modeling or BPMSs.
The evaluation further revealed that ease
of use of the language for defining sensors
should be improved to warrant better user
acceptance. In order to overcome this limi-
tation we plan to devise a mechanism for au-
tomatically deriving skeletons of sensors di-
rectly from fault trees. We expect that this
will allow a smoother transition from high-
level risk definitions to low-level risk con-
ditions. Moreover, aiding features provided
by common source code editors such as au-
tocomplete, syntax highlighting and bracket
matching can be put in place to reduce the
human effort.
The approach presented in this paper
and its operationalization serve as the cor-
nerstone for other techniques that aim to
bridge the gap between risk and process
management. In particular, in [24] we doc-
umented a technique which uses input from
this approach in order to mitigate risks.
Specifically, as soon as one or more risks
are detected which are no longer tolerable,
the technique identifies a set of alternative
mitigation actions that can be applied by
process administrators. A mitigation ac-
tion is a sequence of controlled changes ap-
plied to the process instance, that takes
into account a snapshot of the process re-
sources and data, and the current status
of the system in which the process is exe-
cuted. Furthermore, in [22] we reported on
a second technique which also builds on the
approach presented in this paper to allow
process participants to make risk-informed
decisions. This is achieved by estimating
the risk that the current process instance
will end up with one or more faults based
on the input provided by the participant,
e.g. when filling out a user form based on
the conditions specified for each fault.
This work suffers from several limitations
which offer opportunities for future work.
First, to overcome the low perceived ease of
use of the tool resulting from the usability
tests, we plan to improve the concrete syn-
tax of the sensor definition language, taking
into account the design principle of clar-
ity. Second, manual work is currently re-
quired to convert the results of risk analy-
sis into sensor conditions. This operation
is error-prone, especially in the content of
complex risk definitions. In this respect, we
plan to devise a mechanism for automati-
cally deriving skeletons of sensor conditions
directly from a fault tree. This will allow a
smoother transition from high-level risk def-
initions to low-level sensor conditions. Fi-
nally, we plan to evaluate the usefulness of
templates with end users. In doing so, we
will consider the results against their cor-
relation with the user background in terms
of exposure to YAWL in particular, and to
risk management in general.
Acknowledgments We thank Peter
Hughes for his help with the identification
of process-related risks. This research
is partly funded by the ARC Discovery
Project “Risk-aware Business Process
Management” (DP110100091). NICTA
is funded by the Australian Government
33
as represented by the Department of
Broadband, Communications and the
Digital Economy and the Australian Re-
search Council through the ICT Centre of
Excellence program.
References
[1] van der Aalst, W.M., Schonenberg, M., Song,
M., 2011. Time prediction based on process
mining. Information Systems 36, 450 – 475.
[2] Adams, M., ter Hofstede, A., van der Aalst,
W., Edmond, D., 2007. Dynamic, extensi-
ble and context-aware exception handling for
workflows, in: Proceedings of the 15th Inter-
national Conference on Cooperative Informa-
tion Systems (CoopIS’07), Springer, Vilam-
oura, Portugal. pp. 95–112.
[3] Albrecht, W.S., Albrecht, C.C., Albrecht,
C.O., Zimbelman, M.F., 2008. Fraud Exam-
ination. 3rd ed., South-Western Publishing.
[4] Andersson, B., Bergholtz, M., Edirisuriya,
A., Ilayperuma, T., Johannesson, P., 2005.
A declarative foundation of process models,
in: Pastor, O., e Cunha, J.F. (Eds.), CAiSE,
Springer. pp. 233–247.
[5] Asnar, Y., Giorgini, P., 2008. Analyzing busi-
ness continuity through a multi-layers model,
in: Dumas, M., Reichert, M., Shan, M.C.
(Eds.), BPM, Springer. pp. 212–227.
[6] Bagchi, S., Bai, X., Kalagnanam, J., 2006.
Data quality management using business pro-
cess modeling, in: IEEE SCC, IEEE Com-
puter Society. pp. 398–405.
[7] Bai, X., Padman, R., Krishnan, R., 2007. A
risk management approach to business pro-
cess design, in: ICIS, Association for Infor-
mation Systems. p. 28.
[8] Basel Committee on Bankin Supervision,
2006. Basel II - International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards.
[9] Bentley, J., 1986. Programming pearls: little
languages. Communications of the ACM 29,
711–721.
[10] Bergholtz, M., Gre´goire, B., Johannesson, P.,
Schmitt, M., Wohed, P., Zdravkovic, J., 2005.
Integrated methodology for linking business
and process models with risk mitigation, in:
REBNITA, Citeseer.
[11] Betz, S., Hickl, S., Oberweis, A., 2011. Risk-
aware business process modeling and simula-
tion using xml nets, in: Hofreiter, B., Dubois,
E., Lin, K.J., Setzer, T., Godart, C., Proper,
E., Bodenstaff, L. (Eds.), CEC, IEEE. pp.
349–356.
[12] Bhuiyan, M., Islam, M.M.Z., Koliadis, G.,
Krishna, A., Ghose, A., 2007. Managing
business process risk using rich organizational
models, in: COMPSAC (2), IEEE Computer
Society. pp. 509–520.
[13] Bhushan, N., Rai, K., 2004. Strategic Deci-
sion Making: Applying the Analytic Hierar-
chy Process. 3rd ed., Springer.
[14] Burton-Jones, A., Wand, Y., Weber, R.,
2009. Guidelines for empirical evaluations of
conceptual modeling grammars. Journal of
the Association for Information Systems 10,
495–532.
[15] Casati, F., 1999. A discussion on approaches
to handling exceptions in workflows. ACM
SIGGROUP Bulletin 20, 3–4.
[16] Casati, F., Fugini, M., Mirbel, I., 1999.
An environment for designing exceptions in
workflows. Information Systems 24, 255–273.
[17] Casati, F., Ilnicki, S., Jin, L., Krishnamoor-
thy, V., Shan, M.C., 2000. Adaptive and dy-
namic service composition in eFlow , 13–31.
[18] Cetin, S., Altintas, N., Solmaz, R., 2006.
Business rules segregation for dynamic pro-
cess management with an aspect-oriented
framework, in: Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Workshop on Dynamic Process Man-
agement (DPM 2006), Springer, Vienna,
Austria. pp. 193–204.
[19] Chiu, D.K., Li, Q., Karlapalem, K., 1999. Ex-
ception handling with workflow evolution in
ADOME-WFMS: a taxonomy and resolution
techniques. ACM Siggroup Bulletin 20, 8–8.
[20] Comfort, L., Mosse, D., Znati, T., 2009. Man-
aging risk in real time: Integrating informa-
tion technology into disaster risk reduction
and response. Commonwealth: A Journal of
Political Science 15, 27–45.
[21] Commission, I.E., 1990. IEC 61025 Fault
Tree Analysis (FTA).
[22] Conforti, R., de Leoni, M., La Rosa, M.,
van der Aalst, W.M.P., 2013. Support-
ing Risk-Informed Decisions during Busi-
ness Process Execution. QUT ePrints
55979. Queensland University of Technology.
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/55979.
[23] Conforti, R., Fortino, G., La Rosa, M., ter
34
Hofstede, A.H.M., 2011. History-aware, real-
time risk detection in business processes, in:
Proc. of CoopIS, Springer.
[24] Conforti, R., ter Hofstede, A.H.M., La Rosa,
M., Adams, M., 2012. Automated risk mit-
igation in business processes, in: Proc. of
CoopIS, Springer.
[25] Cope, E.W., Ku¨ster, J.M., Etzweiler, D.,
2009. Risk Extensions to the BPMN 1.1 Busi-
ness Process Metamodel. Technical Report
RZ3740. IBM Research.
[26] Cope, E.W., Ku¨ster, J.M., Etzweiler, D.,
Deleris, L.A., Ray, B., 2010. Incorporating
risk into business process models. IBM Jour-
nal of Research and Development 54, 4.
[27] Cousins, P.D., Lamming, R.C., Bowen, F.,
2004. The role of risk in environment-related
supplier initiatives. International Journal of
Operations & Production Management 24,
554–565.
[28] Davis, F.D., 1989. Perceived usefulness, per-
ceived ease of use, and user acceptance of in-
formation technology. MIS quarterly 13, 319–
340.
[29] Davis, R.B., Brabander, E., 2007. ARIS De-
sign Platform: Getting Started with BPM.
Springer.
[30] Dayal, U., Buchmann, A.P., McCarthy, D.R.,
1988. Rules are objects too: a knowledge
model for an active, object-oriented database
system, in: Advances in Object-Oriented
Database Systems. Springer, pp. 129–143.
[31] Dumas, M., van der Aalst, W.M., ter Hof-
stede, A.H., 2005. Process-Aware Informa-
tion Systems: Bridging People and Software
through Process Technology. Wiley & Sons.
[32] Ermotti, S., 2011. Internal message from
Sergio P. Ermotti, Group CEO, about the
unauthorized trading incident. http://www.
ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/media/
global/unauthorized_trading_incident/
2011-10-05-internal-message-ermotti.
html (Accessed 16 May 2013).
[33] Faulds, F., Bessis, J., 2013. Rogue trading:
Back to front. Journal of Risk Management
in Financial Institutions 6, 4–5.
[34] Fenz, S., 2010. From the resource to the busi-
ness process risk level, in: Proceedings of the
South African Information Security Multi-
Conference (SAISMC’2010), pp. 100–109.
[35] Fenz, S., Neubauer, T., 2009. How to deter-
mine threat probabilities using ontologies and
bayesian networks, in: Proceedings of the 5th
Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and In-
formation Intelligence Research: Cyber Secu-
rity and Information Intelligence Challenges
and Strategies, ACM, New York, NY, USA.
pp. 69:1–69:3.
[36] Gay, P., Pla, A., Lo´pez, B., Mele´ndez, J., Me-
unier, R., 2010. Service workflow monitoring
through complex event processing, in: ETFA,
IEEE. pp. 1–4.
[37] Golden, W., Acton, T., Conboy, K., van der
Heijden, H., Tuunainen, V.K. (Eds.), 2008.
16th European Conference on Information
Systems, ECIS 2008, Galway, Ireland, 2008.
[38] Gu¨nther, C.W., Verbeek, E., 2013. Sup-
porting Risk-Informed Decisions during
Business Process Execution. Tech-
nical Report 55979. Eindhoven Uni-
versity of Technology. http://www.xes-
standard.org/ media/openxes/
openxesdeveloperguide-1.9.pdf.
[39] Halpin, T., Bloesch, A., 1999. Data modeling
in uml and orm: a comparison. Journal of
Database Management (JDM) 10, 4 – 13.
[40] Harland, C., Brenchley, R., Walker, H., 2003.
Risk in supply networks. Journal of Purchas-
ing and Supply Management 9, 51 – 62.
[41] Hermosillo, G., Seinturier, L., Duchien, L.,
2010. Using complex event processing for dy-
namic business process adaptation, in: IEEE
SCC, IEEE Computer Society. pp. 466–473.
[42] Herrmann, P., Herrmann, G., 2006. Security
requirement analysis of business processes.
Electronic Commerce Research 6, 305–335.
[43] Hespos, R.F., Strassmann, P.A., 1965.
Stochastic decision trees for the analysis of
investment decisions. Management Science
11, 244–259.
[44] High Court of Australia, . Patel v
The Queen [2012] HCA 29 (24 August
2012). http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/
cases/cth/HCA/2012/29.html Accessed 2
May 2013.
[45] Hollingsworth, D., 1995. The Workflow Ref-
erence Model. Workflow Management Coali-
tion. Workflow Management Coalition.
[46] Islam, M.M.Z., Bhuiyan, M., Krishna, A.,
Ghose, A., 2009. An integrated approach to
managing business process risk using rich or-
ganizational models, in: Meersman, R., Dil-
35
lon, T.S., Herrero, P. (Eds.), OTM Confer-
ences (1), Springer. pp. 273–285.
[47] Jacque, L., 2010. Global Derivative Debacles:
From Theory to Malpractice. World Scien-
tific. chapter 11: Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale. pp. 179–
196.
[48] Jakoubi, S., Goluch, G., Tjoa, S., Quirch-
mayr, G., 2008. Deriving resource require-
ments applying risk-aware business process
modeling and simulation, in: [37]. pp. 1542–
1554. pp. 1542–1554.
[49] Jallow, A.K., Majeed, B., Vergidis, K., Ti-
wari, A., Roy, R., 2007. Operational risk
analysis in business processes. BT Technol-
ogy Journal 25, 168–177.
[50] Johnson, W.G., 1973. MORT - The Manage-
ment Oversight and Risk Tree. U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission.
[51] Kaegi, M., Mock, R., Ziegler, R., Nibali, R.,
2006. Information systems’ risk analysis by
agent-based modelling of business processes,
in: Soares, C.G., Zio, E. (Eds.), ESREL, Tay-
lor & Francis. pp. 2277–2284.
[52] Kang, B., Cho, N.W., Kang, S.H., 2009.
Real-time risk measurement for business ac-
tivity monitoring (bam). International Jour-
nal of Innovative Computing, Information
and Control 5, 3647–3657.
[53] Karagiannis, D., Mylopoulos, J., Schwab, M.,
2007. Business process-based regulation com-
pliance: The case of the sarbanes-oxley act,
in: RE, IEEE. pp. 315–321.
[54] La Rosa, M., ter Hofstede, A.H.M., Wohed,
P., Reijers, H.A., Mendling, J., van der Aalst,
W.M.P., 2011a. Managing process model
complexity via concrete syntax modifications.
Industrial Informatics, IEEE Transactions on
7, 255–265.
[55] La Rosa, M., Wohed, P., Mendling, J., ter
Hofstede, A.H.M., Reijers, H.A., van der
Aalst, W.M.P., 2011b. Managing process
model complexity via abstract syntax modifi-
cations. Industrial Informatics, IEEE Trans-
actions on 7, 614–629.
[56] Lambert, J.H., Jennings, R.K., Joshi, N.N.,
2006. Integration of risk identification with
business process models. Systems engineering
9, 187–198.
[57] Little, A., Best, P.J., 2003. A framework for
separation of duties in an sap r/3 environ-
ment. Managerial Auditing Journal 18, 419–
430.
[58] Lund, M.S., Solhaug, B., Stølen, K., 2011.
Model-Driven Risk Analysis. Springer.
[59] Luo, Z., Sheth, A., Kochut, K., Arpinar, B.,
2003. Exception handling for conflict resolu-
tion in cross-organisational workflows. Dis-
tributed and Parallel Databases 11, 271–306.
[60] Mendling, J., Strembeck, M., Recker, J.,
2012. Factors of process model comprehen-
sion - findings from a series of experiments.
Decision Support Systems 53, 195–206.
[61] Metropolis, N., 1987. The beginning of the
monte carlo method. Los Alamos Science 15,
125–130.
[62] Meulbroek, L., 2000. Total strategies for
company-wide risk control. Financial Times
9, 1–4.
[63] Meyer, B., 1990. Introduction to the theory
of programming languages. Prentice-Hall.
[64] Mock, R., Corvo, M., 2005. Risk analy-
sis of information systems by event process
chains. International journal of critical in-
frastructures 1, 247–257.
[65] Mogihim, F.H., Zadeh, H., Wickramasinghe,
N., 2012. An intelligence e-risk detection
model to improve decision efficiency in the
context of the orthopaedic operating room,
in: Critical Issues for the Development of
Sustainable E-health Solutions. Springer, pp.
17–32.
[66] Mollenkamp, C., Sonne, P., Hall, D., 2011.
Rogue trading lasted 3 years. The Wall Street
Journal.
[67] Neiger, D., Churilov, L., zur Muehlen, M.,
Rosemann, M., 2006. Integrating risks in
business process models with value focused
process engineering, in: Ljungberg, J., An-
dersson, M. (Eds.), ECIS, pp. 1606–1615.
[68] Object Management Group (OMG),
2011. Business Process Model and
Notation (BPMN) ver. 2.0. Object
Management Group (OMG). URL:
http://www.omg.org/spec/BPMN/2.0.
[69] Oracle, http://download.oracle.com/docs/
cd/E15523 01/integration.1111/e10224/bp
sensors.htm. Accesssed: June 2011. BPEL
Process Manager Developer’s Guide.
[70] Panayiotou, N.A., Oikonomitsios, S.,
Athanasiadou, C., Gayialis, S.P., . Risk
assessment in virtual enterprise networks:
A process-driven internal audit approach,
36
in: Managing Risk in Virtual Enterprise
Networks: Implementing Supply Chain
Principles. IGI Global.
[71] Recker, J., 2010a. Continued use of process
modeling grammars: the impact of individ-
ual difference factors. European Journal of
Information Systems 19, 76–92.
[72] Recker, J., 2010b. Explaining usage of pro-
cess modeling grammars: Comparing three
theoretical models in the study of two gram-
mars. Information & management 47, 316–
324.
[73] Recker, J., 2010c. Opportunities and con-
straints: the current struggle with bpmn.
Business Process Management Journal 16,
181–201.
[74] Recker, J., La Rosa, M., 2012. Understand-
ing user differences in open-source workflow
management system usage intentions. Infor-
mation Systems 37, 200–212.
[75] Rikhardsson, P., Best, P.J., Green, P., Rose-
mann, M., 2006. Business process risk man-
agement and internal control: A proposed re-
search agenda in the context of compliance
and ERP systems, in: Proceedings of the Sec-
ond Asia/Pacific Research Symposium on Ac-
counting Information Systems, Melbourne,
Australia.
[76] Rosemann, M., zur Muehlen, M., 2005. Inte-
grating risks in business process models, in:
ACIS, AISeL.
[77] Rotaru, K., Wilkin, C., Churilov, L., Neiger,
D., 2008. Formalising risk with value-focused
process engineering, in: [37]. pp. 1583–1595.
pp. 1583–1595.
[78] Rotaru, K., Wilkin, C., Churilov, L., Neiger,
D., Ceglowski, A., 2011. Formalizing process-
based risk with value-focused process engi-
neering. Information Systems and e-Business
Management 9, 447–474.
[79] Salzer, E., 2011. Live aus der praxis–
fallbeispiele fu¨r spezifische kommunika-
tionsstrategien, in: Quintessenz der Un-
ternehmenskommunikation. Springer, pp.
46–90.
[80] Schmitt, M., Gre´goire, B., Dubois, E., 2005.
A risk based guide to business process de-
sign in inter-organizational business collab-
oration, in: International Workshop on Re-
quirements Engineering for Business Need
and IT Alignment (REBNITA 2005).
[81] Schwartz, P., 2000. When good companies do
bad things. Strategy & Leadership 28, 4–11.
[82] Sienou, A., Karduck, A.P., Lamine, E., Pin-
gaud, H., 2008. Business process and risk
models enrichment: Considerations for busi-
ness intelligence, in: ICEBE, pp. 732 –735.
[83] Sienou, A., Karduck, A.P., Pingaud, H.,
2006. Towards a framework for integrating
risk and business process management, in:
Dolgui, A., Morel, G., Pereira, C.E. (Eds.),
Information Control Problems in Manufac-
turing. Elsevier. volume 6, pp. 615–620.
[84] Sienou, A., Lamine, E., Pingaud, H., Kar-
duck, A.P., 2009. Aspects of the bprim
language for risk driven process engineering,
in: Meersman, R., Herrero, P., Dillon, T.S.
(Eds.), OTM Workshops, Springer. pp. 172–
183.
[85] Sienou, A., Lamine, E., Pingaud, H., Kar-
duck, A.P., 2010. Risk driven process engi-
neering in digital ecosystems: Modelling risk,
in: DEST, pp. 647–650.
[86] Simons, R.L., 1999. How risky is your com-
pany? Harvard Business Review 77, 85.
[87] Singh, P., Gelgi, F., Davulcu, H., Yau, S.S.,
Mukhopadhyay, S., 2008. A risk reduction
framework for dynamic workflows, in: IEEE
SCC (1), IEEE Computer Society. pp. 381–
388.
[88] Smallman, C., 1996. Risk and organizational
behaviour: a research model. Disaster Pre-
vention and Management 5, 12–26.
[89] Standards Australia and Standards New
Zealand, 2009. Standard AS/NZS ISO 31000.
[90] Straumann, T., 2010. The UBS Crisis in
Historical Perspective. Technical Report. In-
stitute for Empirical Research in Economics,
University of Zurich.
[91] Strecker, S., Heise, D., Frank, U., 2010.
RiskM: A multi-perspective modeling
method for IT risk assessment. Information
Systems Frontiers 13, 1–17.
[92] Suriadi, S., Weiß, B., Winkelmann, A.,
ter Hofstede, A., Wynn, M., Ouyang, C.,
Adams, M., Conforti, R., Fidge, C., La Rosa,
M., Pika, A., 2012. Current Research in
Risk-Aware Business Process Management -
Overview, Comparison, and Gap Analysis.
BPM Center Report BPM-12-13. BPMcen-
ter.org.
[93] Sybase, http://www.sybase.com.au/files/
37
White Papers/Sybase CEP Implementation
Methodology wp.pdf. Accessed: June 2011.
Sybase CEP Implementation Methodology
for Continuous Intelligence.
[94] Taylor, P., Godino, J.J., Majeed, B., 2008.
Use of fuzzy reasoning in the simulation of
risk events in business processes, in: Louca,
L., Chrysanthou, Y., Oplatkova, Z., AlBe-
gain, K. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 22nd Eu-
ropean Conference on Modelling and Simula-
tion, pp. 25–30.
[95] ter Hofstede, A.H.M., van der Aalst, W.M.P.,
Adams, M., Russell, N., 2010. Modern Busi-
ness Process Automation: YAWL and its
Support Environment. Springer.
[96] Thomas, H., 2010. Sick to Death. Allen &
Unwin.
[97] Tjoa, S., Jakoubi, S., Quirchmayr, G., 2008.
Enhancing business impact analysis and risk
assessment applying a risk-aware business
process modeling and simulation methodol-
ogy, in: ARES, IEEE Computer Society. pp.
179–186.
[98] Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Solutions
Association, http://www.vics.org. Accessed:
June 2011. Voluntary Inter-industry Com-
merce Standard (VICS).
[99] Wang, D., Rundensteiner, E.A., Ellison,
R.T., Wang, H., 2011. Active complex event
processing infrastructure: Monitoring and re-
acting to event streams, in: Abiteboul, S.,
Bo¨hm, K., Koch, C., Tan, K.L. (Eds.), ICDE
Workshops, IEEE. pp. 249–254.
[100] Weiß, B., Winkelmann, A., 2011. Develop-
ing a process-oriented notation for modeling
operational risks - a conceptual metamodel
approach to operational risk management in
knowledge intensive business processes within
the financial industry, in: HICSS, IEEE Com-
puter Society. pp. 1–10.
[101] Woo, G., 2008. Terrorism Risk. Wiley Hand-
book of Science and Technology for Home-
land Security. 2:1–17. John Wiley & Sons.
[102] zur Muehlen, M., Ho, D.T.Y., 2005. Risk
management in the bpm lifecycle, in: Bus-
sler, C., Haller, A. (Eds.), Business Process
Management Workshops, pp. 454–466.
38
Appendix A. Detailed Abstract Syntax
This Appendix provides a detailed description of each element of the abstract syntax of
the sensor definition language.
Definition Description
Sensor , v : Variables; t : Trigger ; riskCon : RiskCon; A sensor is composed of a set of variables, a trigger,
faultCon : BoolCon; consequence : MaCon; a risk condition, a fault condition, and a consequence.
Trigger , timer | event A trigger can either can be timer or event based.
Variables , Assignment+ A set of variables is a several assignments.
Assignment , result : varName; i : Info A variable assigns a name to an information.
Info , VarFun | Definition | CaseExp | An information is a function invoked on a variable,
CaseEleExp a definition, or a piece of information collected from
the process instance (i.e. CaseExp or CaseEleExp).
VarFun , ResCon | ResSimFun | ResComFun The three types of functions invoked on variables are
available: ResCon, ResSimFun or ResComFun.
Definition , c : constant A definition is a constant.
CaseExp , cis : CaseIDStat ; a : Action A piece of information related to the process instance.
CaseEleExp , ce : CaseExp; ton : TaskOrNet A piece of information related to an element
(i.e. a task or a net) of the process instance.
TaskOrNet , taskLabel | netName The identifier of a task or of a net.
CaseIDStat , absExp | relExp | CaseConSet Identifies an instance or a set of instances.
Action , predAct | taskOrNetVar | SubVarExp | An action is either a predefined action, a task
inputPredAct variable, a net variable, a subvariable, or a
predefined action that requires an input.
SubVarExp , var+ A subvariable of a task variable or of a net variable.
CaseConSet , CaseCon | CaseParam | CaseConExp The three types of identifiers for a set of instances.
CaseCon , ton : TaskOrNet ; a : Action; co : CompOp; Identifies instances for which a specific piece of
rhe : RHExp information is compared with a RHExp.
CaseParam , i : idFun; co : CompOp; rhe : RHExp Identifies instances for which the instance ID
is compared with a RHExp.
CaseConExp , ccs1 , ccs2 : CaseConSet ; bo : BoolOp Identifies instances for which several conditions
are satisfied.
CompOp , l | leq | g | geq | eq | contains | isContained Set of comparison operators.
RHExp , constant | function | varName | RHExpSet Can be a constant, a function, a function invoked
on a variable, or a RHExpSet .
RHExpSet , rhe1 , rhe2 : RHExp; o : Op An arithmetical expression built using RHExp.
RiskCon , riskLikelihood , riskThreshold : MaCon A risk condition is composed of two MaCon.
MaCon , MaITE | MaExp | MaFor | FixMaFor | A arithmetical condition can be an if-then-else
ResSimFun | ResComFun | varName | expression, an expression, a loop, a function on a
constant variable, a variable name, or a constant.
MaITE , if : BoolCon; then, else : MaCon A arithmetical condition that varies based on the
result of a boolean condition.
MaExp , MaUnExp | MaBinExp The two types of arithmetical expression:
MaUnExp or MaBinExp.
MaUnExp , s : sub; me : MaCon A negative arithmetical expression.
MaBinExp , me1 ,me2 : MaCon; mo : MaOp A arithmetical operation between MaCons.
MaOp , add | sub | mul | div | exp | mod The set of arithmetical operators.
BoolCon , BoolITE | BoolExp | BoolFor | A boolean condition can be an if-then-else expression,
FixBoolFor | Comp | ResCon | an expression, a loop, a comparison, a function on a
varName | constant variable, a variable, or a constant.
BoolITE , if , then, else : BoolExp A boolean condition that varies based on the result of
another boolean condition.
BoolExp , BoolUnExp | BoolBinExp The two types of boolean expression:
BoolUnExp or BoolBinExp.
BoolUnExp , n : neg; e : BoolCon A negated boolean expression.
BoolBinExp , e1, e2 : BoolCon; bo : BoolOp A boolean operation between BoolCons.
BoolOp , and | or The set of boolean operators.
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Definition Description
Comp , ce1 , ce2 : CompElem; co : CompOp A comparison between two CompElems.
CompElem , MaCon | ResListFun | varName | constant A comparison element can be a arithmetical
condition, a function invoked on a variable,
a variable, or a constant.
ResCon , res : varName; a : Activity A function invoked on a variable using an activity.
ResListFun , result : varName; lrf : listResFun A function invoked on a variable. It returns a list.
ResSimFun , resource : varName; srf : simResFun A function invoked on a variable which is a resource.
ResComFun , res1 , res2 : varName; crf : comResFun A function invoked on two variables which are resources.
Activity , resource : varName; lrf : ResListFun A function invoked on a variable which is a resources.
MaFor , t : TypeMF ; lr : ListResult ; A nested loop that cycles on each element of a
fme : ForMaCon ListResult and aggregates the result of a ForMaCon
based on a TypeMF .
FixMaFor , fixEle : varName; mf : MaFor A MaFor that cycles on each element of a ListResult
using as index of the loop the element fixEle.
TypeMF , add | mul Two forms of aggregations: adding and multiplying.
BoolFor , t : TypeBF ; lr : ListResult ; A nested loop that cycles on each element of a
fbe : ForBoolCon ListResult and aggregates the result of a ForBoolCon
based on a TypeBF .
FixBoolFor , fixEle : varName; bf : BoolFor A BoolFor that cycles on each element of a ListResult
using as index of the loop the element fixEle.
TypeBF , and | or Two forms of aggregations: AND or OR.
ListResult , varName+ A list of variables.
ForMaCon , ForMaITE | ForMaExp | constant | A arithmetical condition can be an if-then-else
varName expression, an expression, a constant, or a variable.
ForMaITE , if : ForBoolCon; A arithmetical condition that varies based on the
then, else : ForMaCon result of a boolean condition.
ForMaExp , ForMaUnExp | ForMaBinExp The two types of arithmetical expression:
ForMaUnExp or ForMaBinExp.
ForMaUnExp , s : sub; me : ForMaCon A negative arithmetical expression.
ForMaBinExp , me1 ,me2 : ForMaCon; mo : MaOp A arithmetical operation between ForMaCon.
ForBoolCon , ForBoolITE | ForBoolExp | ForComp | A boolean condition can be an if-then-else expression,
varName | constant an expression, a comparison, a variable, or a constant.
ForBoolITE , if , then, else : ForBoolExp A boolean condition that varies based on the result of
another boolean condition.
ForBoolExp , ForBoolUnExp | ForBoolBinExp The two types of boolean expression:
ForBoolUnExp or ForBoolBinExp.
ForBoolUnExp , n : neg; e : ForBoolCon A negated boolean expression.
ForBoolBinExp , e1, e2 : ForBoolCon; bo : BoolOp A boolean operation between ForBoolCons.
ForComp , ce1 , ce2 : ForCompElem; co : CompOp A comparison between two ForCompElems.
ForCompElem , ForMaCon | varName | constant A comparison element can be a arithmetical
condition, a variable, or a constant.
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Appendix B. Actions
This appendix describes all actions available in the sensor definition language.
Action Description
(ID) returns the ID of the generic instance that is being analyzed
[IDCurr] returns the ID of the instance that the sensor is monitoring
Count returns the number of times a task has been completed
offerResource returns the resources to which the task has been offered
allocateResource returns the resources to which the task has been allocated
startResource returns the resources that started the task
completeResource returns the resource that completed the task
isOfferd returns “true” if the task has been offered
isAllocated returns “true” if the task has been allocated
isStarted returns “true” if the task has been started
isCompleted returns “true” if the task has been completed
OfferTime returns the time when the task has been offered
AllocateTime returns the time when the task has been allocated
StartTime returns the time when the task has been started
CompleteTime returns the time when the task has been completed
OfferTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been offered
AllocateTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been allocated
StartTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been started
CompleteTimeInMillis returns the time (in millisecond) when the task has been completed
PassTimeInMillis returns the amount of time (in millisecond) that was needed to complete the task
TimeEstimationInMillis returns an estimation of the time (in millisecond) needed to completed the task/process
Variable returns the value of the variable or sub-variable required
offerDistribution returns the list of resources to which the task is offered by default
allocateDistribution returns the list of resources to which the task is allocated by default
startDistribution returns the list of resources to which the task is started by default
offerInitiator returns the offering policy of the task (user or system)
allocateInitiator returns the allocating policy of the task (user or system)
startInitiator returns the starting policy of the task (user or system)
CountElements returns the number of instances that satisfy the parameters required
FraudProbabilityFunc
returns the probability of a fraud using as parameters: the current number of executions,
the maximum number of executions allowed, the parameter used to group these instances,
the parameter used to identify a temporal window, and the dimension of the temporal
window
List of actions of the architecture
Appendix C. Nested Loops
This appendix describes the four types of nested loops available in the sensor definition
language.
For Description
forAND[][]
executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets) resolving the
expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the AND conjunction of the
results obtained
forOR[][]
executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets) resolving the
expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the OR conjunction of the
results obtained
forADD[][]
executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets) resolving the
expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the sum of the results obtained
forMUL[][]
executes a nested loop for each list provided in input (among the first couple of brackets) resolving the
expression (defined among the second couple of brackets), then returns the product of the results
obtained
List of nested loops
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Appendix D. Functions
This appendix describes the functions available in the sensor definition language.
Function Description
offeredList
returns the list of tasks currently offered to the resource/resources (returns a list
of list if used on resources)
allocatedList
returns the list of task currently allocated to the resource/resources (returns a list
of list if used on resources)
startedList
returns the list of task currently started by the resource/resources (returns a list
of list if used on resources)
offeredNumber
returns the number of tasks currently offered to the resource/resources (returns
a list if used on resources)
allocatedNumber
returns the number of tasks currently allocated to the resource/resources (returns
a list if used on resources)
startedNumber
returns the number of tasks currently started by the resource/resources (returns
a list if used on resources)
offeredMinNumber returns the minimum number of tasks currently offered to the resource/resources
allocatedMinNumber returns the minimum number of tasks currently allocated to the resource/resources
startedMinNumber returns the minimum number of tasks currently started by the resource/resources
offeredMinNumberExcept
returns the minimum number of tasks currently offered to the resource/resources
excluding the resource/resources provided in input (the input is provided using
a dotted format after the name of the function)
allocatedMinNumberExcept
returns the minimum number of tasks currently allocated to the resource/resources
excluding the resource/resources provided in input (the input is provided using a
dotted format after the name of the function)
startedMinNumberExcept
returns the minimum number of tasks currently started by the resource/resources
excluding the resource/resources provided in input (the input is provided using a
dotted format after the name of the function)
offeredContain
returns true if the task provided in input (using a dotted format after the name
of the function) is currently offered to the resource/resources.
allocatedContain
returns true if the task provided in input (using a dotted format after the name
of the function) is currently allocated to the resource/resources.
startedContain
returns true if the resource/resources started the task provided in input (using
a dotted format after the name of the function).
List of functions
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Appendix E. Questionnaire
Part 1) Background Questions
E1a: Which description matches best
your current status?
 Student
 Academic
 Professional
E1b:Please specify your gender:
 Female
 Male
 Prefer not to tell.
E2: How many years ago did you start
process modeling?
Years
E3a: How many process models have you
analyzed or read within the last 12 months?
(A year has about 250 work days. In case
you read one model per day, this would sum
up to 250 models per year)
Models
E3b: How many process models have you
created or edited within the last 12 months?
Models
E3c: How many activities did all these
models have on average?
Activities
E4a: How many work days of formal
training on process modeling have you re-
ceived within the last 12 months? (This in-
cludes e.g. university lectures, certification
courses, training courses. 10 weeks of a 120
minute university lecture is roughly 3 work
days)
Days
E4b: How many work days of self-
education have you made within the last 12
months? (This includes e.g. learning-by-
doing, self-study of textbooks or specifica-
tions)
Days
Part 2) Your experience with Work-
flow Management Systems
Q1: Which of the following (process)
modelling techniques other than YAWL
have you used to describe a process or pro-
cedure? Tick all that apply.
 None. Please go to question 10.
 BPMN
 UML
 Activity Diagrams
 EPCs
 BPEL
 Petri Nets
 Protos
 Other:
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Q2: If you have used any technique other
than YAWL, roughly, how many concep-
tual process models do you think you have
created?
process models
Q3: If you have used any technique other
than YAWL, roughly, how many workflow
models (i.e. executable process models) do
you think you have read?
workflow models
Q4: How long have you been using a
Workflow Management System?
 I am evaluating to do so/I have just
started
 Less than 1 month
 1 - 6 months
 7 - 12 months
 More than 1 year
Q6: Indicate your level of agreement to
the following statements on the given scale
by circling the number that best describes
your view on the statement.
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Overall, I am very
familiar with Work
flow Management
Systems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel very confident
in my understanding
of Workflow
Management
Systems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel very competent
in using Workflow
Management
Systems.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Part3) Your experience with the
YAWL system
Q1: How long have you been using
YAWL?
 I am evaluating to do so/I have just
started
 Less than 1 month
 1 - 6 months
 7 - 12 months
 More than 1 year
Q2: Please indicate, roughly, the typi-
cal extent of usage of YAWL. This includes
any activity related to the YAWL system,
e.g. development, reading documentation,
modelling, executing or simulating YAWL
workflows, and using a system that is based
on some YAWL component. Keep in mind,
a regular working days has eight hours (480
minutes).
 Not applicable
 On average, I spend hours and
minutes on YAWL every working
day.
Q3: Roughly, how many YAWL models
do you think you have created or read?
YAWL models
Q4: Which features of the YAWL system
have you ever used? Tick all that apply
 Not applicable
 Execution environment
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 Syntax checker/verification
 Cancelation region
 OR-join
 Multiple instance task
 Deferred choice
 Milestone
 Retain familiar/Separation of duties
 Deferred distribution
 Distribution set filter
 Allocation strategies
 Worklets/Exlets
 Custom services
 Configuration
Part 4) Risk Sensor Comprehension
In this part, you will be shown 3 risks re-
lated to a process described in YAWL. You
will be asked questions about each of them.
Risk 1: Consider the following YAWL
model and associated risk condition de-
scribed below.
Variables:
A = case(current).Update Shipment Payment
Order(Count)
B = case(Update Shipment Payment
Order(Count)>=E).Update Shipment
Payment Order(CountElements)
C = case(Update Shipment Payment
Order(Count)>=A AND Process
Shipment Payment(isOffered)=“true”).
Update Shipment Payment
Order(CountElements)
D = 0.6
E = 5
Sensor Condition:(C/B)>D where“/”
is the division operator
Q0. How difficult is it to understand the
meaning of the above sensor condition:
 1 – very simple
 2 – rather simple
 3 – neutral
 4 – rather difficult
 5 – very difficult
Q1. Does the sensor send a notification if
the task Update Shipment Payment Order
may not be executed?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q2. Can the sensor notify a risk if the
task Update Shipment Payment Order has
been executed only twice?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q3. Does A retrieve the value of a vari-
able named Count of the task Update Ship-
ment Payment Order?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q4.Does C return the number of in-
stances where the task Process Shipment
Payment has been offered?
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 Yes / No / I do not know
Q5. Does D indicate a threshold that if
exceeded produces a notification from the
sensor?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Risk 2: Using the YAWL model of page
6 above, an Approval fraud risk has been
identified using Fault Tree Analysis, as
shown below.
To detect the risk of this fault, we first
have to check whether there is an order, say
order o of customer c, to be approved. This
means checking that an instance of task Ap-
prove Shipment Payment Order is being ex-
ecuted. Moreover, we need to check that
either of the following conditions holds:
1. o has been allocated to a Senior Fi-
nance Officer who has already ap-
proved another order for the same cus-
tomer in the last d days; or
2. at least one Senior Finance Officer is
available who approved an order for
customer c in the last d days and
all other Senior Finance Officers who
never approved an order for c during
the last d days are available
Q0. How difficult is it to understand the
meaning of the above risk:
 1 – very simple
 2 – rather simple
 3 – neutral
 4 – rather difficult
 5 – very difficult
Q1. Could condition Abe used as trigger
for the sensor?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q2. If condition B is expressed using a
variable, would the following assignment be
correct?
B = case(current).Approve Shipment
Payment Order(allocateResource)
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q3. Could condition D be expressed us-
ing only one variable in the risk condition?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q4. Could condition E be expressed us-
ing only one variable in the risk condition?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q5. Could the AND between conditions
B and C be expressed using only one vari-
able in the risk condition?
 Yes / No / I do not know
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Risk 3: Consider the following YAWL
model and the associated risk condition
described below.
Variables:
A = case(current).Process Shipment
Payment.Customer
B = case(Process Shipment Payment.
Customer=A AND Issue Debit
Adjustment(isCompleted)=“true”).
Issue Debit Adjustment
(CountElements)
C = case(Process Shipment Payment.
Customer=A AND Issue Credit
Adjustment(isCompleted)=“true”).
Issue Debit Adjustment
(CountElements)
D = case(Process Shipment Payment.
Customer=A).Process Shipment
Payment(CountElements)
F = 0.4
Sensor Condition:
(B/D)>F|(C/D)>F where“/” is the di-
vision operator and “|” is the logical OR
operator
Q0. How difficult is it to understand the
meaning of the above sensor condition:
 1 – very simple
 2 – rather simple
 3 – neutral
 4 – rather difficult
 5 – very difficult
Q1. Does the sensor send a notification
if the task Issue Debit Adjustment is not
executed?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q2. Will the sensor send a notification as
soon as the task Issue Credit Adjustment is
completed?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q3. Does B return the number of in-
stances where the customer is the same
of the current instance and the task Issue
Debit Adjustment has been completed?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q4. Does C return the number of in-
stances where the task Process Shipment
Payment has been offered?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Q5. Does B always return a value greater
than the value return by C?
 Yes / No / I do not know
Part 5) Your views on the use of
the Sensor-based component of the
YAWL system
This part of the survey captures some in-
formation about how you overall rate the
Sensor-based component of the YAWL sys-
tem you have been using. Please note again
that all information you provide will be
treated confidently. Thus, we ask you to
please answer honestly.
In the following, you will be given a
number of statements on opinions that
you may have towards the Sensor-based
component of the YAWL system. Please
indicate your level of agreement to the
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statements on the given scale by ticking
the box that best describes your view on
the respective statement.
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Conditions
Guidance was
available to me in
the use of the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Specialized
instruction
concerning the use of
the Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system was
available to me.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A specific person or
group was available
for assistance with
difficulties with the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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I am extremely
pleased with my use
of the Sensor-base
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am extremely
contented with my
use of the
Sensor-base
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am extremely
delighted with my
use of the
Sensor-base
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am extremely
satisfied with my use
of the Sensor-base
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Usefulness
Overall, I find the
Sensor- based
component of the
YAWL system useful
for modelling
process-related risks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system useful
for achieving the
purpose of modelling
process-related risks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system helps
me in meeting my
process-related risks
modelling objectives.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Ease of Use
I find it easy to
model process-
related risks in the
way I intended using
the Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find learning to use
the Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system is
easy.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I find easy to create
process-related risks
using the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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to Use
I intend to use the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system when
I have to define and
detect risks in
business processes.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I predict I would use
the Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I plan to use the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system in the
future.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I prefer to continue
to work with the
Sensor-based
component of the
YAWL system.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
49
